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THE DATE OF ANON. *IN THEAETETUM*

A re-examination of the anonymous *Commentary on the Theaetetus*,[1] henceforth abbreviated *K*, is overdue. It may yet prove to be the most important document we possess for plotting the course of pre-Plotinian Platonism, and is by far the largest surviving portion of a pre-Plotinian commentary on a complete work of Plato. It offers us insights into the issues of the first century B.C. which are unparalleled in other extant Middle Platonist works, *either* because of the subject of the work and its consequent tendency to bring to mind the epistemological debates between Philo of Larissa, Antiochus of Ascalon, and Aenesidemus, *or* because the author, whom we may call A, is writing at a time comparatively close to those debates.

Recent work in the field of Middle Platonism has found little place for *K*. John Dillon does not afford it a separate section in his general work *The Middle Platonists*,[2] partly because he tries to identify A with Albinus (270–1, 289–90), partly because it is not easy to say where *K* belongs. John Glucker, who is well aware that the work has material of relevance to his discussion of *Academici* and *Platonici*, commits an unfortunate error in placing the work in the third century A.D.[3] He believes that in doing so he is following Diels and Schubart,[4] and that this date fits the school of Gaius.[5] He is apparently unaware that the papyrus itself is generally agreed to belong to the second century, probably not too late in that century.[6] The school of Gaius was active in the second quarter of the century, for the physician Galen heard an unknown pupil of Gaius in Pergamum in A.D. 143/4;[7] he also heard Gaius' well-known pupil Albinus during the fifties.[8]

The connection between the school of Gaius and *K* was made at a time when the *Didascalicus* ascribed to Alcinous and the *De Platone* of Apuleius were thought to be the products of that school.[9] The former work was actually thought to be the work of Albinus.[10] There are a number of unremarkable similarities between *K*, *Didasc.*, and Apuleius, and it long seemed probable that all sprang from the same school.[11] But we are now witnessing a change of heart, and Dillon has shown that Apuleius should not be connected with Gaius' circle even allowing for *Didasc.* being the work of Albinus,[12] while John Whittaker has demonstrated that there is no good reason for

[1] Ed. H. Diels and W. Schubart (*Berliner Klassikertexte* ii, 1905).

[2] *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977), hereafter cited as *MP*.

[3] *Antiochus and the late Academy* (*Hypomnemata* lvi, Göttingen, 1978), hereafter cited as *Ant.*, pp. 39, 219, 304.

[4] But see *intro.* xxiv: 'Der vorliegende Kommentar zum Theätet muss, wie die Schrift lehrt, vor dem dritten nachchristlichen Jahrhundert entstanden sein. Auch fehlt darin jeder Hauch des Neuplatonismus. Dagegen ist er ein Muster jener eklektischen Philosophie, wie sie in dem ersten Jahrhundert v. Chr. und den beiden ersten n. Chr. herrschte'. Cf. also Schubart in *Papyri Berolinenses* (Bonn, 1911), p. 31, where the papyrus is marked 'Saec. II A.D.'.

[5] Glucker, *Ant.* pp. 39, 219, 220.

[6] See Diels/Schubart, *intro.* xiv, for evidence of the earliness of the papyrus; cf. Dillon, *MP*, p. 270: 'The papyrus itself belongs to the first half of the second century'.

[7] *An. Morb.* 31. 23–32. 5 (Marquardt).

[8] *Libr. Prop.* 97. 9–11 (Müller).

[9] In 1906 appeared the work which pioneered the Gaius-School theory, T. Sinko, *De Apulei et Albini doctrinae Platonicae Adumbratione* (Krakow).

[10] Following J. Freudenthal, *Der Platoniker Albinos und der falsche Alcinoos* (Berlin, 1875).

[11] For the connections see Diels, *intro.* xxx–xxxiii, and Dillon *MP*, p. 271.

[12] *MP*, pp. 306–38.

regarding *Didasc.* as Albinus' work.[13] Hence it is clear that all we can reliably use as evidence for the 'School of Gaius' are a collection of fragments from the commentaries of Albinus (and possibly of Gaius himself), and a tiny six-paragraph work by Albinus known as the *Prologue* or *Isagoge*.[14]

There is no similarity between the *Prologue* and *K* which ought not to be regarded as commonplace. Both works are evidence of an approach to Plato through the Dialogues rather than through summaries of Platonic doctrine (contrast *Didasc.* and Apuleius), and both employ the traditional Middle Platonic τέλος of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ.[15] Both employ the term φυσικὴ ἔννοια in the context of the Platonic theory of 'recollection'.[16] But against this should be set the fact that the *Prologue* proposes *Alc.* I, *Phd.*, and *Tim.* as a normal introductory programme of Platonic studies, an order which conflicts with that in which A wrote his commentaries;[17] Albinus fails to mention *Tht.* (along with *Phdr.* and *Critias*) in his classification of Platonic Dialogues;[18] Gaius and Albinus are known to have seen two levels of dogmatism in Plato,[19] while A sees in Plato some of the reticence of the New Academy, towards which he leans;[20] and Albinus knows that *Meno* 98a reads αἰτίας λογισμῷ, while A's text appears to have read αἰτίᾳ λογισμοῦ.[21] It is thus unlikely that either Gaius or Albinus wrote *K*

[13] 'Parisinus Graecus 1962 and the writings of Albinus', *Phoenix* 28 (1974), 320 ff. and 450 ff.

[14] *Platonis Opera*, ed. C. Fr. Hermann (Teubner), vi. 147–51. Page references to *Prol.*, to the *Didascalicus*, and to the anon. *Prolegomena ad Platonis Philosophiam* from this volume will be given with an H.

[15] 7. 14–20; cf. *Didasc.* 28 (p. 181. 16–182. 7 H) and Apul. *De Plat.* 23 (p. 126. 4 ff. Thomas) in addition to Albinus *Prol.* 5 (p. 150. 10 H), 6 (p. 151. 4 H). The doctrine is early enough to appear in Arius–Eudorus (Stob. *Ecl.* 2, p. 49. 8 Wachsmuth), ordinary enough to appear at D.L. 3. 78.

[16] 46. 43, 47. 44 ff.; cf. 23. 7, 47. 20; cf. *Prol.* 6 (p. 150. 21–3 H).

[17] Before writing *K*, A had written on *Tim.* (35. 10–12) and *Symp.* (70. 10–12), and he promises a work on *Phd.* at 48. 7–11; the work is probably not yet written, though it may be that the student who reads *Tht.* is not yet expected to have read *Phd.*

[18] *Prol.* 3 (p. 148 H). While there is a possibility that omissions have been caused by problems of transmission (see O. Schissel, *Hermes* 62 (1931), 215–26), Albinus may have deliberately passed over *Phdr.*, for he adhered to the view that the rational soul alone is immortal (Proclus, *In Tim.* 3. 234. 9–18 Diehl), and it is very difficult to reconcile this view with the myth of *Phdr.* (245 c ff.). One doubts whether he saw the work as being spurious, for he quoted 237 bc at p. 147. 8 (though without naming the work); but it is possible that he regarded both *Phdr.* and *Tht.* as educationally unsound. Neither work would seem to have been prominent in the programme of education which he sketches at sections 5–6.

[19] Proclus, *In Tim.* 1. 340. 23 ff. (Diehl).

[20] His treatment of the Academics at 6. 29–7. 14, 54. 43–55. 7, and 70. 12–26 shows that he considered Academic 'scepticism' as a device for attacking Stoics, etc., which was used in a manner consistent with common sense and ἐνάργεια (70. 21–6). It did not lead to ἐποχή, nor preclude their having δόγματα (in a weak sense, 54. 43–55. 7). Moreover, A shows genuine interest in Pyrrhonism (61. 10–63. 40). For A's use of Philo of Larissa's alleged criterion of ἐνάργεια see 5. 34–6 (cf. Numenius fr. 8 Leemans = 28 des Places, Aenes. in Phot. cod. 212, 170a37–8, Cic. *Ac.* 2.34, *K* 70. 21–6, Glucker *Ant.* 72–4, and the author's 'Philo of Larissa on agreement and the self-evident', *Dionysus* 5 (1981), 66 ff.). A's brand of 'scepticism' is perhaps similar to that which he fathers on Plato, e.g. 58. 36–9: οὐ γὰρ ἐφεῖταί μοι οὔτε ψεῦδος συγχωρῆσαι οὔτε ἀληθὲς ἀφανίσαι, or 59. 12–21, where Plato is said to avoid open demonstration of his views, but to reveal his pleasure imperceptibly to the familiar reader.

[21] This was originally held to make A's identification with Albinus difficult (Diels/Schubart, *intro.* xxxiii), but Dillon rightly does not think the point conclusive (*MP*, p. 271). The phrase appears wrongly in *K* 3. 2–3 and 15. 21–3, correctly at *Prol.* 6 (150. 27 H). If the *Meno*, and this passage especially, were not crucial to A's epistemology, one might dismiss the mistake as a slip of memory, but it is more likely that some deliberate 'emendation' is responsible. Another such alteration to the end of *Meno* (99e6) occurs at Clem. *Strom.* 5. 83. 4 (Stählin), cf. 84. 1–2. Antiochus' theory that νοῦς is the cause of all cognitive activity (Cic. *Ac.* 2. 30) may be behind both emendations, νοῦς being *both* the αἰτία λογισμοῦ which converts right opinion to knowledge

and, in view of the failure of Albinus to mention *Tht.* in his classification, one doubts whether they would have commented on the work at all.

A further point against associating *K* with the school of Gaius is that Galen, whose Platonism was learnt from pupils of Gaius, regards the descriptions 'Academic' and 'Platonic' as referring to two quite separate groups of philosophers, the former being close to the Sceptics, while the latter are dogmatists.[22] He himself defends the dogmatist cause against Favorinus the 'Academic', and has a tendency to regard the *Timaeus* as a work of second-degree dogmatism, as Gaius and Albinus had done.[23]

It seems unlikely, then, that *K* is the product of the school of Gaius, and our next task is to inquire into the possibility that some other known Platonist of the second century A.D. wrote it. We may rule out Plutarch on grounds of style; there is no commentary on *Tht.* in the Lamprias Catalogue; and he gives a different, though perhaps related, view of Socratic 'midwifery' from that of *K*.[24] We may add that Plutarch never, in extant works, refers to any philosopher as 'Platonic',[25] though the term is part of A's working vocabulary.

Platonic commentaries were written by Calvenus Taurus, head of a Platonic circle at Athens frequented by Aulus Gellius.[26] It seems that he commented upon the *Gorgias* as well as the ever-popular *Timaeus*. I find nothing to indicate any interest in epistemology or *Tht.* in Taurus. His commentary on the *Timaeus* must have been a weightier affair than *K*,[27] and there are difficulties in reconciling his ethics with those of *K*.[28]

Atticus, another Platonic commentator who worked on *Phdr.* as well as *Tim.*,[29] is even less likely to be A. His *floruit* of A.D. 176–80 puts him rather late, especially if he worked outside Egypt.[30] He shows no sign of interest in logic and epistemology such as one might expect from one who wrote on *Tht.*,[31] and his anti-Aristotelian

and the initial divine impulse towards right opinion and virtue. Though A seems to interpret *Meno* 98ab correctly at col. 3, he may be using a text transmitted *via* Antiochus' school.

[22] *An. Morb.* 92 clearly views the Academics as a different kind of philosopher from the Platonics, closer to the Sceptics (ibid. 60), as also in *Opt. Doctr.* (aimed at Favorinus).

[23] He took the work's theories on the human body and its ailments seriously enough for both a commentary on the medical passages and a Plato-based attack on some self-styled Platonists (*Scr. Min.* ii. p. 64. 19 ff. Müller). But where it suits him Galen will remind one that Plato did not think everything in *Tim.* to be certain, *Plac.* 9. 794–5.

[24] *Mor.* 999c ff., on which see below p. 166.

[25] See Glucker, *Ant.* p. 209, who points out that only the spurious *De Mus.* (1131 f.) refers to 'Platonics', who are in any case the immediate followers of Plato, not a later sect.

[26] On Taurus see Dillon, *MP*, pp. 237–47, H. Dörrie, 'L. Kalbenos Tauros', *Kairos* 1–2 (1973), 24–35. We are given greater insight into Taurus as a person than as a philosopher in Gellius; for the commentary on *Gor.* see *N.A.* 7. 14. 5.

[27] Compare Dillon's comments on its remains at *MP*, pp. 246–7 'fairly detailed exegesis' with those on *K* at 270: 'maintains a level of stupefying banality'.

[28] Dillon, *MP*, pp. 240–2, makes much use of Gellius *N. A.* 12. 5. 7, where we see a rather Antiochian emphasis on οἰκείωσις and τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν. But note that *K* rejects the former as a suitable basis for justice, cols. 6–7.

[29] For *some* fragments see J. Baudry's collection (Paris, 1931); from passages in Proclus, *In Tim.*, we learn of his exegesis of *Tim.* and *Phdr.* (the latter at 3. 277. 15 Diehl).

[30] But there is no evidence for his presumed Athenian connections, and he has 'a rather curious name to be borne by an Athenian' (Dillon, *MP*, p. 248). I assume that ὑπομνήματα were not designed for wide circulation, judging both from the word itself and from their uselessness to persons not possessing a text. Their obvious place was within the philosophical school, until such time as fame demanded their wider availability.

[31] Extant remains of Middle Platonists have been partly shaped by the interests of Neoplatonists and Christians who preserve them. But Atticus' division of philosophy shows clearly that ethics and theology-directed metaphysics/physics were his main concerns, while logic was merely a tool (Eus. *P.E.* 509b = fr. 1 Baudry).

stance, religious motivation, and obsession with points of language count against identification with A.[32]

Harpocration's *Commentary on Plato* in 24 books could have contained an interpretation of *Tht.*,[33] but we know nothing of any epistemological views which he may have had. His interests seem to have been centred on theology and psychology, and on Platonic works which discuss these subjects. As a pupil of Atticus he seems too late to have written *K.*

In Severus we find a commentator who showed some interest in epistemology but significantly, his views on the subject are in conflict with *Tht.* He held that the soul had a single critical faculty, λόγος, which employed νόησις as well as αἴσθησις as its instruments.[34] This seems difficult to reconcile with *Tht.* 184c–186e, where the mind apprehends non-sensibles direct, without the assistance of any organ analogous to the senses. The theory of Severus is inspired by the two-world ontology of the *Timaeus*, and just as he wants to place a single genus (τὸ τί) over the sensible and intelligible οὐσίαι,[35] so he wants to place a single cognitive faculty over sensation and intellection. But *K*'s theory appears to be inspired almost exclusively by *Tht.* and *Meno*, where the two-world ontology is least in evidence, and where no attempt is made to subordinate epistemology to ontology. Severus' date is most unclear, though Dillon's guess would make him rather late to have written *K.*[36]

Finally, we must point out that Numenius differs very much from A in holding the view that the Academic sceptics had deserted Plato's teachings.[37] There are irreconcilable differences between the two writers on οὐσία, for Numenius could not possibly accept that οὐσίαι could be in flux.[38] Similar objections presumably apply in the case of Numenius' pupil Cronius.[39]

Of second-century Platonists not known to have commented on the Dialogues we may mention Maximus Tyrius, Nicostratus, and the author of *Didasc.* Maximus was a popular philosopher, not a scholar; no reader of his *Orations* would associate him with *K.* Nicostratus is known mainly for his pitiful attacks on Aristotle's *Categories*,[40] and, though A generally treats other schools sensibly and sympathetically, I see no means of finally excluding his candidature. The author of *Didasc.*, however, can be distinguished from A through an examination of their respective approaches to epistemology.

The extensive chapter on epistemology at *Didasc.* 4 (pp. 154. 8–156. 20 Hermann) draws on material from a variety of Dialogues, as well as from non-Platonic sources; weight is given to *Tim.* 28a, *Phil.* 38b–40a, and the myth of *Phdr.*[41] The wax-tablet

[32] The anti-Aristotelian elements are patent, as is the religious motivation (cf. Dillon, *MP*, p. 253: 'the general tone is one of *furor theologicus*'). For his linguistic endeavours (Proclus *In Tim.* 1. 284. 13) and other features of his commentaries see Dillon, *MP*, p. 257.

[33] See J. Dillon, 'Harpocration's *Commentary on Plato*: fragments of a Middle Platonic Commentary', *Calif. Studs. in Class. Ant.* 4 (1971), 125 ff.

[34] Proclus *In Tim.* 1. 255. 5 ff. (Diehl).

[35] ibid. 1. 227. 13 ff. (Diehl).

[36] I know of no evidence that could assist us to fix a date.

[37] He wrote a polemical work against the New Academy, partially preserved by Eusebius (*P.E.* 14. 727a ff. = frr. 1–8 Lang = 24–8 des Places).

[38] As can be seen from his whole approach to τὸ ἀγαθόν, asking first τί τὸ ὄν, then fiercely dismissing the claims of body and matter (frr. 11–13 Lang = 2–4a des Places).

[39] Cronius seems to have followed Numenius closely; his scant remains follow those of Numenius in Lang's collection (Brussels, 1937).

[40] Simpl. *In Categ. saepe.* On him see K. Praechter (*Hermes* 57 (1922), 481 ff.) and *MP*, pp. 233–6.

[41] *Tim.* dominates at 154. 22–9 H. *Tht.* 184–6 may underlie 154. 29–32, but the doctrine is

section of *Tht.* 191c–195b is used at 154. 35–155. 12, interpreted with an eye on the *Philebus* passage. The view of the criterion δι' οὗ at 154. 11–18 is not easily reconciled with *Tht.* 184c ff., particularly 185 de. Certainly *Didasc.* does not lead one to suppose that its author thought *Tht.* to be the major Platonic work on the criterion, as the majority of Platonics in A's time believed (see col. 2 and fr. 4). A himself had been prepared to admit that *Tht.* indulged in considerable discussion of the criterion (col. 2), and would not himself have ignored its contribution as *Didasc.* does at 154. 10–18; he uses the terms 'criterion δι' οὗ' and 'criterion ᾧ' (= δι' οὗ ?)[42] in a manner barely reminiscent of *Didasc.*

More striking than the way in which *Didasc.* uses *Tht.* is its neglect of *Meno*, a work well known to A. *Didasc.* 4 fails to use the term ἀνάμνησις,[43] and the binding of right opinion by αἰτίας λογισμός (98a) is not mentioned: this is particularly important, since A believed that this passage held the key to the question raised by *Tht.*[44]

Another significant difference is the use of the term ἐπιστήμη ἁπλῆ, 155. 28–9, which is identified here with the 'natural notions' and with latent 'memory' of the Ideas. A regards 'simple knowledge' as the subject of *Tht.*, but he does not rush to identify it with either natural notions or recollected Ideas.[45] It is possible, however, that he did so towards the end of the work or, more likely, that he regarded the memory of the Ideas as one category of 'simple knowledge'.

I believe that these points will suffice to suggest that A did not write *Didasc.*, though similarities also exist. The very occurrence of such terms as ἐπιστήμη ἁπλῆ, κριτήριον δι' οὗ, and φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι might indeed indicate some relationship between them, but I should regard *Didasc.* 4 as more highly developed and more closely interfused with an ontology. It bears the stamp of that second-century interest in theology, metaphysics, and the soul's extra-bodily existence which is generally lacking in *K.*

As one compares *K* with the remains of second-century Platonist literature one begins to realize that the work does not belong here. Though there were many minor Platonists from that century whose views cannot be discovered, many of our arguments against identifying A with particular Platonists will have some force when applied to second-century authors in general.

It should be a primary consideration that *Tht.* does not seem to be an important work of Plato any longer, and that the school of Gaius can apparently afford to

too ordinary to affirm as much. *Phil.* 38b ff. is the inspiration for 154. 35 ff. and 155. 12–15 and *Soph.* 263e for 155. 15–17. However, there are few signs of *first-hand* use of the dialogues in the composition of this work.

[42] A's concept of the criterion δι' οὗ is not evident in col. 2, but it seems likely that it is to be identified with ᾧ κρινοῦμεν τὰ πράγματα at 2. 26–8. *When this latter is accurate* the lasting παραδοχή of things well judged becomes knowledge. It is natural to assume that A demanded accuracy of both senses and intellect; *Tht.* 184–6 would allow him to think of the latter as a kind of criterion δι' οὗ, apprehending things δι' αὐτῆς (185e1). *Tht.* 184d4 (ἢ διὰ τούτων . . . αἰσθανόμεθα), however, would sanction the view that we judge *through* the senses but *with* (dat.) the mind, and, as an Academic, A is much more likely to attribute accuracy to mind than to senses (cf. Diels, *Dox.* 396b17–19). Thus A's criterion *through which* is *either* both senses and mind *or* only senses; but in *Didasc.* 4 (p. 154. 12–18H) it is only λόγος φυσικός.

[43] We meet μνήμη at 4 (155. 29 H), betraying the influence of *Phdr.* 249c–254b, where it occurs 6 times. The more usual term ἀνάμνησις occurs in the context of arguments for immortality at 25 (177. 37 H).

[44] 3. 1–7: we know P when we know διὰ τί P.

[45] Stoic theory of common/natural notions is assimilated to Platonic recollection theory as early as Cic. *T.D.* 1. 57, partly becuase Plato uses ἔννοια and ἐννοεῖν in the relevant passage of *Phd.* (73c8, c9, 74a6, b6, c8, d1, d9, e2, 75a1, a6×2, a11, 76a3). Now if recollected Ideas = simple knowledge, while simple knowledge is the subject of *Tht.*, it is odd that discussion of recollection is deferred until A's work on *Phd.* (48. 7–11).

overlook it.[46] That it had once been more important I shall endeavour to show shortly, but let us recall that in A's time the work was supposed to be concerned with the criterion (2. 11–17, 21–32, fr. 4), and criteriology had once been considered one of the two supreme parts of philosophy.[47] As the mechanical theories of knowledge of the Hellenistic age became less fashionable among Platonists, so the relevance of *Tht.* became more limited: limited to such passages as those on Socratic midwifery (148e–151d) and the flight to the higher world (176a–d).[48] One doubts whether many Middle Platonists would have thought of commenting on *Tht.* before they tackled *Phd.*, as A seems to have done.[49]

Next one should bear in mind that the second century was a time when philosophers might call themselves 'Academics' or 'Platonics',[50] but that these descriptions were not interchangeable.[51] One assumes, however, that A includes himself among the 'Platonics' (2. 11, fr. 4), while he obviously has sympathy for the Academic sceptics.[52] If forced to choose between the two terms, then he would have elected to be called 'Academic'.[53] We can only point to two second-century philosophers who would have welcomed such a description, Plutarch and Favorinus. Glucker properly allows that a few of their followers may have adopted such a name,[54] and indeed there is much common ground between A and Plutarch.[55] But if we assume a *direct* relationship between A and Plutarch, then I think that A must be placed first. Both tackle the reason why 'Socrates' is banned by the God from conceiving wisdom (*Tht.* 150c, *Mor.* 999c ff., *K* cols. 54–9), and both use Socrates' attribution of his infertility to God's intervention as a clear sign that he is not speaking with his customary irony. But A moves in a world where many believe this passage to be a case of irony, and he makes his point simply and forcibly as a result.[56] Plutarch, however, is able to dismiss the

[46] For its omission from Albinus' classification and programme of study see above, p. 162 and n. 18. D.L. 3. 62 speaks of teachers who had begun with *Tht.*, but this could have been well before the time of D.L. (or his source). *Tht.* actually comes seventh in a list of eight works with which teachers of Plato had begun, so that teachers who used it first were either not recent or not important. Clearly semi-sceptics are more likely to have used it than dogmatists.

[47] Antiochus at *Ac.* 2. 29; but others of his time surely agreed.

[48] Socratic 'midwifery' is discussed by Plut. *Mor.* 999c ff. and Max. Tyr. *Or.* x. 4a–h; see also Philo Alex. *Her.* 247, *Mut.* 144, and the 'maieutic' type of dialogue at Albinus *Prol.* 3 (148. 36 H), 6 (150. 34 H). Lines 176a–d are well known from the time of Eudorus (Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 49. 8 Wachsmuth) and Philo Alex. *Fug.* 63, 82, etc. (see n. 15). The wax-tablet section is known to Philo Alex. (*Deus* 43, *Her.* 181, *Mut.* 212), and influences Plut. frr. 215 h, 217 j (Sandbach, Loeb), *Didasc.* 4 (154. 35–155. 12 H). Galen *Plac.* 7. 631 is influenced by 184 b–186 e.

[49] See above, n. 17.

[50] For these terms see Glucker *Ant.* pp. 206–25, with my review (*Prudentia* 12 (1980), 109–18).

[51] See above, n. 22.

[52] See above, n. 20.

[53] This follows from (*a*) his sympathies (see n. 20), and (*b*) his One-Academy theory (55. 2–7): in supposing himself to follow Plato he must also suppose that he follows later Academics.

[54] See Glucker, *Ant.* p. 292; on p. 293 he notes that Galen refers to no Academic sect late in life, giving the impression that it had died out.

[55] One recalls the mild Academic attitude which Plut. adopts in *Comm. Not.*, where he tries to show that it is not the Academics who overturn κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, ὁμολογία, and ἐνάργεια (on the connection between these terms see part 2 of my article cited in n. 20). Note Plutarch's distrust of 'private notions' (1062a, cf. *K* 46. 34). Both authors see 'recollection' as important, and both apparently discussed it in relation to *Phd.* (Plut. frr. 215–17 = Olymp. *In Phd.* p. 155. 24 ff. Norvin, cf. *K* 48. 7–11). Plutarch's view of Socratic midwifery is close enought to *K* to attract five references to *K* in H. Cherniss' notes to *Q.P.* i (Loeb, 1976).

[56] *K* 58. 39–59. 2 uses *Tht.* 151c7–d3 to refute those who detect εἰρωνεία in the midwifery passage. The dogmatist view of *Tht.* was threatened by phrases such as ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας

irony theory more casually, adding a new aspect to the argument, but clouding the issue in the process.[57] It seems to me that he is developing a point which has now been established.

Then there is the absence from *K* of any sign of second-century obsession with theology or with the disembodied soul. Even the doctrine of recollection, which is found relevant to *Tht.* (cols. 47–8), does not receive a lengthy discussion; the question is deferred until a work on *Phd.*[58] Nor is there any sign that the author was preoccupied with Platonic metaphysics. Thus his main concerns are no more second-century than Hellenistic.

Fourthly, *K* has failed to agree with second-century Platonist epistemology wherever we have been able to compare it. Above all it does not try to derive its theory of cognition from *Tim.*, as do Severus and *Didasc.*,[59] nor from *Rep.* 6–7.[60] He is closest to Albinus *Prol.* 6, Maximus *Or.* 10, and Plutarch in 'Olympiodorus'.[61]

We proceed now from arguments against a second-century date to evidence for an earlier one. Here the background to *K* and the author's aims and tactics will be important. The work gives details of the normal ways of viewing *Tht.* as a whole, and A is constantly trying to establish his own view that the work is about 'simple and uncompounded knowledge'.[62] Thrasyllus, writing in the first half of the first century A.D., was able to subtitle *Tht. On Knowledge* (D.L. 3. 58). Since his edition of the dialogues, in the famous tetralogies, was to become standard, one wonders whether any commentator after his time would have needed to spend time establishing that knowledge is the subject of *Tht.*, particularly when this is so obviously the case. Admittedly A was trying to show that *Tht.* concerned a particular type of knowledge, but his principal opposition (*οἱ πλείους τῶν Πλατωνικῶν*, fr. 4) said that the work was on the criterion (cf. 2. 11–17); a second group of opponents thought that it concerned those things of which there was no knowledge, contrasting it with the *Sophist*, which was alleged to concern things of which there is knowledge (2. 32–9). There is no suggestion that anybody thought *Tht.* to be about a *different kind* of knowledge from that proposed by A. Accordingly one must assume that A writes before, or very shortly after, Thrasyllus. A pre-Thrasyllan date is also indicated by

(150c4), which seemed to picture a sceptic 'Socrates'. The dogmatist resource was to appeal to *εἰρωνεία*, and *K* answers by showing that 'Socrates' makes no attempt to be modest in this passage, since he likens himself to a God (*a*) in respect of his *εὔνοια*, and (*b*) in respect of his not accepting falsity nor hiding truth. Since A saw likeness to God as the foundation of virtue (7. 14–20), such a claim to likeness could show no modesty. Plutarch also sees use of God's name as a sign of arrogance rather than *εἰρωνεία*, quoting 151c5–d3, the very passage used by *K*: as if he remembered that he had seen the passage used to refute the modesty theory.

[57] Note 999c: *οὐ γὰρ εἰρωνευόμενός γε καὶ παίζων*... Without *καὶ παίζων* the passage would argue, like *K*, that to call upon God's support for one's practice is hardly a sign of modesty. But with these words it emphasizes instead that one does not call upon a God unless one is serious.

[58] 48. 7–11, and see n. 17 above.

[59] Severus in Proc. *In Tim.* 1. 255. 5 ff. (Diehl); *Didasc.* 4 (154. 22–9 H) and 14 (169. 20–6 H); 'Platonics' in S.E. *Math.* 7. 141–4, cf. Cic. *Ac.* 1. 30–2.

[60] Discussed by Plut. *Mor.* 1001c ff.; *Didasc.* 7 (162. 7–20 H).

[61] frr. 215–17 (Sandbach, Loeb) = Olymp. *In Phd.* 155. 24 ff. and 212. 1–26 (Norvin).

[62] *K* 2. 18–21, 15. 2–23, 17. 25–32. Note here that my argument is unaffected by R. G. Hoerber's theory that the secondary titles of the dialogues antedate Thrasyllus. *K* seems unaware of the existence of any established tradition relating to a secondary title of *Tht.* In any case Hoerber can only produce evidence of the earliness of *a few* such titles, and even then they need not be official titles (see Hoerber, 'Thrasyllus' Platonic canon and the double titles', *Phronesis* 2 (1958), 10–20). Indeed *K* 48. 10 refers to *Phd.* by its long-established secondary title.

A's failure to attribute *Tht.* to a particular category of Platonic Dialogue during his introduction.[63]

If one asks the question 'When did Platonists regard *Tht.* as a discussion of the criterion?', one arrives at a similar conclusion. It seems clear that *Tht.* was not regarded as an authoritative Platonic essay on criteriology at *Didasc.* 4 or in Galen.[64] Even Plutarch's extant works pay little attention to *Tht.* as a source for thoughts on the criterion. Criteriology was not itself a favourite Middle Platonic issue, so why should a Middle Platonist have defied the obvious and claimed that it was the subject of *Tht.*? Those who did so must have been especially concerned with the subject and with Plato's views upon it. A himself is concerned with it: the subject of knowledge necessarily involves consideration of the criterion (2. 21–3), and the insignificant words *ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται* (*Tht.* 151 e 2) give rise to an extended discussion of the Pyrrhonist rejection of all Hellenistic criteria in favour of the *phenomenon*. It is in fact a faithful picture of Aenesideman scepticism,[65] and to judge from Sextus (*PH.* 1. 222) there may also be a reference to Aenesidemus' aporetic view of Plato at 54. 38–43.[66]

[63] A's introduction is historical, and seems to deal chiefly with Protagoras. But to judge from Albinus' *Prologos* (and from D.L. 3. 49 ff.) Thrasyllus' activities had generated much interest in the arrangement and classification of dialogues. The anonymous author of *P. Oxy.* 3219 (ed. M. Haslam, XLV, pp. 29–39) shares interests with the source of D.L. 3. 52–6 (see Haslam's notes), and would presumably have been interested in classification, while *Didasc.* 6 (p. 158. 24 H) shows awareness of the classifications; anon. *Prol. in Plat. Phil.* 17 ff. shows interest. One suspects that A's phrase *ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν* (59. 7, 13) would have read *ἐν τοῖς ζητητικοῖς διαλόγοις* if it had post-dated Thrasyllus.

[64] Galen's criterion is *αἰσθησίς τε καὶ νόησις ἐναργής* (*Plac.* 9. 778 *et saepe*).

[65] 61. 15–46. For Aenesidemus' use of the *φαινόμενον* see D.L. 9. 78, 106; also S.E. *Math.* 8. 215–16. The Pyrrhonist principle at 61. 12 (*οὐδὲν ἄν τις καθοριστικῶς δογματίζοι*) occurs at D.L. 9. 71, and may be linked with Aenesidemus on the basis of D.L. 9. 106 (*οὐδὲν ὁρίζει δογματικῶς*). *οὐδὲ τοῦτο δογματίζοντος* (61. 38–9) utilizes the Aenesideman phrase *οὐδὲ τοῦτο* (see K. Janacek, *Eirene* 14 (1976), 99). Though the appearance of the moment is said to be Pyrrho's criterion, Aenesidemus' interest in maintaining Pyrrhonism's difference from dogmatic philosophies is reflected in the claim that Pyrrho did not try to show that the *φαινόμενον* exists, because of equal arguments to the contrary (cf. Aenes. at D.L. 9. 106: *διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν*) and his treatment of all presentations as equal (cf. Aenes. in Phot. cod. 212, 169 b 40 ff.). Here the term for 'equally strong' arguments (*ἰσοκρατής*) at 61. 26 suggests that Sextus' term (*ἰσοσθενής*) was not yet standardized, while the verb *ἐξομαλίζειν* (61. 28) sounds authentic (cf. *ἀνωμαλία* in Aenes., D.L. 9. 78) but is not Sextan. 63. 1 ff., on the claim that all things are relative, leads to a discussion of *συνθεωρούμενα* (63. 11–20) and *κρῖνον* as expected from Sextus' account of the eighth Aenesideman trope (*PH.* 1. 135–6). Material from tropes 1, 5 (S.E. = 7 D.L.), and 6 is also present. Aenesidemus' sensation–reason dichotomy (cf. Phot. cod. 212, 169 b 20, S.E. *Math.* 8. 40) also appears.

[66] I think it is wrong to accept, with U. Burkhard, *Die angebliche Heraklit-Nachfolge des Skeptikers Aenesidem* (Bonn, 1973), the correction made by Natorp at *PH.* 1. 222 (*κατὰ ⟨τοὺς⟩ περὶ . . .*) rather than that of Heintz (*κατὰ ⟨τῶν⟩ περὶ Μηνόδοτον καὶ Αἰνησίδημον*) at *PH.* 1. 222 for several reasons. (*a*) Sextus cites Timon as an authority on this point (223), and it would be remarkable that he should cite others, particularly in *PH* where much material is unoriginal but acknowledgement is only made in a striking case of debt (e.g. to Aenes. at 1. 180). Why mention Menodotus at all (*hapax* in Sextus), let alone use the periphrasis *οἱ περὶ . . .*? Because Sextus has a *στάσις* in mind? But why use a *στάσις* as an authority rather than its single authoritative leader? One *corrects* a *στάσις*. (*b*) That Aenes. elsewhere (Phot. cod. 212) points to differences between Academics and Pyrrhonians proves nothing, for the Academics in question were Philo's school. Photius' conclusion that Aenes. also overthrows Plato (170 b 37–9) is based on Photius' dogmatic view of Plato, and is unrelated to criticism of the Philonian school. That school is criticized because it is the school of Tubero, to whom the work is addressed (169 b 32–5). (*c*) The extreme view of Plato as a sceptic does make him out to be almost Pyrrhonist: *K* 54. 38–43 shows us that he was seen as free from all doctrine, while *Prol. in Plat. Phil.* 10–11 (205. 2–207. 10 H) opposes those who used the term *ἐφεκτικός* (205. 3, 11, 207. 9, 12 H), asserting

Aenesidemus was himself the product of an age when leading Academics argued about the dogmatic or aporetic nature of Platonic teaching,[67] and the issue could only be settled with recourse to clear statements on the nature of the criterion within the Dialogues. It was natural, then, that they should look to *Tht.* as being the work most likely to supply them with Plato's thought on the issue of the criterion: one of the two most important issues of the age (Cic. *Ac.* 2. 29).

In particular the sceptic and semi-sceptic[68] factions would have used *Tht.*, and the extant parts of the commentary give us insights as to how they did so. The section on Socratic 'midwifery' was taken to show that Socrates, and hence his follower Plato,[69] gave birth to no ideas, but merely questioned the ideas of others.[70] The section on the views of Protagoras (152a ff.) and on flux-doctrine (152d ff.) had clearly received considerable attention, and were probably taken to show that Plato's clearly attested Heraclitism (as regards the physical world) went hand in hand with the view that all sensations are relative to the perceiver.[71] Of particular importance would have been the section in which Socrates introduces the question of dreams, sickness, and madness (157e–158e), during which he remarks upon the difficulty of determining whether we are awake or dreaming.[72]

But what evidence is there outside *K* to show that *Tht.* was studied by members of the sceptical Academy? Glucker refers us to the anonymous *Prolegomena to Plato's Philosophy*,[73] which, though late, offers good evidence of a time when some people tried to have Plato classed among οἱ ἐφεκτικοί τε καὶ ⟨ . . . ⟩ Ἀκαδημαϊκοί. Glucker hopefully tries to relate the evidence to the Academy of Arcesilaus, but one must doubt (*a*) whether a late Neoplatonic author would have had access to Second Academic material on such matters, and (*b*) whether the author would have used the term

that Plato πρεσβεύει ἀκαταληψίαν (205. 4, 14, 31 H). There are strong grounds for supposing that *Prol.* is replying to Aenes. in particular; see below, pp. 170 ff. (*d*) Aenesidemus lived when it was important to establish ancient authorities for one's views; D. L. 9. 71–3 gives a list of Pyrrhonist predecessors from Homer to Plato; Aenesidemus had himself made *some kind* of appeal to the thought of Heraclitus (*PH.* 1. 210–12), which was probably part of a wider appeal to ancient authority. (*e*) Sextus cannot be following Aenes. in refuting the view that Plato is *Pyrrhonian*, since nobody prior to Aenes. could have espoused that view; if Aenes. called Plato 'sceptic', then this may have been misunderstood by Sextus as being equivalent to 'Pyrrhonist', when it in fact meant only 'prepared to look at both sides of the issue'.

[67] Cic. *Ac.* 1. 46, 2. 15, 74; S.E. *Math.* 7. 141–4 (from Antiochus' *Canonica*?). The dispute is attested by S.E. *PH.* 1. 221 and D.L. 3. 51. To judge from *Ac.* the debate was comparatively unsophisticated around 87 B.C., but one imagines that rival claims of Philo and Antiochus to be the true followers of Plato soon gave rise to detailed quarrels over interpretation, as found in *K* and anon. *Prol. in Plat. Phil.* 10–11.

[68] The Fourth Academy, or such of its members as accepted the meaningfulness of ἐνάργεια as well as the impossibility of certainty, along with Cicero, Plutarch, A, etc.

[69] 54. 31–43, on *Tht.* 150c6: διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν. For Plato as a follower of Socrates' doubts see *Ac.* 2. 74.

[70] 53. 37 ff. on 150c4 (ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας) suggests that the phrase had been interpreted absolutely by some. Similarly 54. 14 ff. on 150c6, 55. 34 ff. on 150c8–d1 (οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός), 55. 45 ff. on 150d1–2 (οὐδέ τί μοί ἐστιν εὕρημα . . . ἔκγονον).

[71] Note 63. 48–64. 3: ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ πάντα ῥεῖν τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι πάγιον μηδὲ τὸ αὐτό. Also 64. 28–36 on 152b1: ἐπακολουθήσωμεν.

[72] 158b8–c1. Of *K* all that is extant here is fr. 2 (on 157e–8a). But Cic. *Ac.* 2. 47–53, 88–9, shows that the sensations of the dreamer, drunkard, and madman were much discussed, and serious study of *Tht.* would quickly bring Plato's attitude to light, supporting the sceptic view that there is no obvious difference between these and healthy sensations.

[73] *Ant.* pp. 38–9; he claims that the ultimate source cannot be Pyrrhonian, failing to see the importance of the term *ephectic* in anon. *Prol.* L. G. Westerink, in his note on Olymp. *In Phd.* 6. 14, also sees the arguments as stemming from the second Academy.

ἐφεκτικοί, either of his own accord or as a result of reading early Academic–sceptic literature. He had earlier distinguished the followers of the New Academy from 'ephectics' (p. 202. 23–7 Hermann), and the view of Plato which he tries to refute suits the 'ephectics' better: it sees Plato as an extreme sceptic, favouring *complete* ἀκαταληψία (10, p. 205. 33–9 H), no προσδιορισμός (10, p. 205. 10–12 H), no knowledge, no teaching, only ἀπορία (10, p. 206. 12–13). The picture is too extreme to emanate from the Fourth Academy of Philo of Larissa and Charmadas, if not from the Second and Third Academies,[74] and I strongly suspect that we have instead some arguments from Aenesidemus, who had apparently been a leading light of one extreme view of Plato, almost certainly of the sceptic view.[75] The lack of credibility in such an extreme picture would not have bothered Aenesidemus, whose aim would not have been to persuade the reader so much as to counterbalance the arguments used by others to create a dogmatist picture of Plato. Nor would he be trying to paint Plato exactly as a Pyrrhonist, but rather as an ancient authority to support Pyrrhonist doubts. In particular he was probably attempting to show that Plato was 'ephectic', i.e. that he sanctioned suspension of judgement; hence the author drops any reference to the New Academy after p. 205. 4, and thereafter tries to show that Plato does not belong to the 'ephectics' (205. 11, 207. 9, 12). 'Ephectic' was the standard late Neoplatonic term for Pyrrhonist-sceptic.[76] Moreover we seem to have five '*tropes*' of showing Plato to have been 'ephectic', recalling the activities of Aenesidemus,[77] and signs of Aenesideman language.[78]

Since Aenesidemus had connections with the Academy, and may possibly have studied with Heraclitus of Tyre,[79] his view of Plato would still probably be based on arguments previously used by the more extreme adherents of the Academy, among whom we may place this Heraclitus (Cic. *Ac.* 2. 11–12). Even though the *Prolegomena* may be attacking a Pyrrhonist picture of Plato, it must still be assumed that much of the material derives from Academic sources ultimately. It is therefore relevant that

[74] I cannot here discuss how far suspension of judgement was an ideal of Arcesilaus, but surely he did not refrain from προσδιορισμός (205. 10–12), nor did he wish to show Plato overturning *number* in *Tht.* (205. 20 H). That anon. is not refuting Carneadean probabilists is evident from the fact that no provision had been made for grading impressions.

[75] Against me see Burkhard (above, n. 66, with my reply). He fails to discuss all evidence for the sceptic view of Plato.

[76] The *Ephectic* sect is the Pyrrhonist sect in the introductions to the *Categories*-commentaries of [Ammonius], Olymp., Elias, and Philopon, and probably in the lectures of Ammonius which inspired these commentaries. But Ammonius was also the likely origin of comments on the *ephectic* view of Plato in the late Plato-commentaries, for see Olymp. *In Phd.* 8. 17 (Westerink) = 51. 1–12 (Norvin): he wrote a book against the *ephectic* claim that Plato doubted the immortality of the soul.

[77] Besides the ten famous 'tropes' (D.L. 9. 87 ff.) we have the eight 'tropes' against cause-theory (S.E. *PH.* 1. 180). The five ways of showing Plato to be *ephectic* are not referred to as 'tropes', but each is numbered, and one receives the impression of a very methodical exercise in forced interpretation. There is a similarity between the fourth 'trope' here and the way in which Aenes. counters the notion of truth in S.E. *Math.* 8. 40.

[78] Compare pp. 205. 6–7 H (ἐπιρρήματά τινα ἀμφίβολά τε καὶ διστατικά) with Aenes. in Photius 169 b 39–40 (τὰ μὲν τίθενται ἀδιστάκτως, τὰ δὲ αἴρουσιν ἀναμφιβόλως), cf. 170 a 29/32. Compare also p. 206. 26 (τὸ διαπορεῖν ὁδός ἐστι πρὸς τὸ καταλαβεῖν) with S.E. *PH.* 1. 210 (ὁδὸν εἶναι τὴν σκεπτικὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν).

[79] Photius cod. 212, 169 b 38 describes Tubero as *both* an Academic and a συναιρεσιώτης of Aenes., probably meaning that they had taken the same side in the internal dispute between Philo and Antiochus. At D.L. 9. 116 Aenes. is said to have studied under Heraclides, for which Pappenheim (*AGP* 1 (1888), 37 ff.) proposed to read Heraclitus. Since many mistakes in D.L. stem from abbreviations (see J. Meyer, *Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic Background* (*Hermes Einzelschriften* 40 (1978)), 25–7), this would seem plausible.

Tht. has supplied the bulk of the evidence. The third argument (10, p. 205. 18–21) dealt with *Tht.* only, claiming that Plato abolished all definition of knowledge there, and number as well.[80] It appears that 197e2–3 was used to establish that the mind was, for Plato, empty at birth (p. 205. 22–3, 206. 20). The fifth argument was equally dependent upon *Tht.*, for Plato is alleged to have said *οὐδὲν οἶδα, οὐδὲ διδάσκω τι, ἀλλὰ διαπορῶ μόνον* (p. 206. 12–13). This is dependent upon the 'midwifery' section, and one might single out 150c8, 150d6–7, and 149a9 as of particular relevance to the three respective claims. It is not then surprising that *K* says of 150c4 (*ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας*): *ἐκ τοιούτων λέξεών τινες οἴονται Ἀκαδημαϊκὸν τὸν Πλάτωνα*...(54. 38–42).

It thus seems clear that *Tht.* was an important work for those who wanted to deny Plato's acceptance of any criterion of knowledge, and that it was studied by them in relation to the concept of such a criterion. They would naturally have seen its subject as the criterion, though Aenesidemus is unlikely to have been included among the 'Platonics' who did so.

But how did the dogmatists view *Tht.*? Few clues are available, but we may suspect the influence of *Tht.* in the Antiochian account of Plato's philosophy at Cic. *Ac.* 1. 24 and 1. 31. The account of the two basic principles of nature, *ποιοῦν* and *πάσχον*, which together produce physical objects and perceived qualities (*Ac.* 1. 24), may derive from the account of sensation at *Tht.* 156 a–c misinterpreted along Stoic lines and presumed to be Plato's own theory of the sensible world. The interdependence of active and passive principles may likewise have been deduced from *Tht.* 157a4–7. More important for our present purpose is the fact that *Tht.* may be behind the account of the flux and unknowable nature of the physical world at 1. 31, in particular the assertion that nothing is ever *unum constans* or even *idem*;[81] one should compare *Tht.* 152d2–4: *ἕν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς*.... (cf. 153e4–5, 157a8, 182b3–4). It seems that Plato's adherence to the flux doctrine and his distrust of the physical world and of the senses were so well known that not even Antiochus could ignore them. Instead he countered by extracting a positive theory of the physical world from the flux-section of *Tht.*, accepting that the work was primarily concerned with objects which were opinable rather than knowable according to Plato's theory (*Ac.* 1. 31–2).

It is no surprise, then, that *K* mentions a second and smaller group of 'Platonics' who said that *Tht.* deals with non-knowables, whereas *Soph.* dealt with knowables (2. 32–9). The failure of *Tht.* to arrive at any explanation of knowledge could thus be attributed to its preoccupation with unsuitable objects rather than to Plato's rejection of the concept of knowledge. Obviously the view that *Soph.* deals with knowables must come either from dogmatist interpreters or from the mildest brand of Academic–sceptic, who no longer maintained that things were all *ἀκατάληπτα* in their own right (S.E. *PH.* 1. 235). And it seems rather improbable that even Philo

[80] In his edition of anon. *Prol.* (Amsterdam, 1962) L. G. Westerink refers to *Tht.* 147d–8b, 198a–c, and 204b–e, 'none of which is really pertinent'. One might also consider 195e–6c and 199b, where Plato fails to explain miscalculations, thus raising the question of the validity of arithmetic, and 152d2, etc., where nothing is allowed to be *one*; when combined with 204b–e, where the whole is just the sum of the parts, the absence of *one* abolishes arithmetic. Aenes. had an interest in the whole–part problem (S.E. *Math.* 9. 337), and at *Math.* 10. 216–17 numbers are regarded as mere multiples of a corporeal (hence flux-prone) unit.

[81] I tend to reject the *et* which Halm adds between *unum* and *constans*, believing that the phrase may relate to the concept *ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό* at *Tht.* 152d2, etc. Manutius' reading *ne idem* seems obvious; cf. *K* 64. 1–2: *μηδὲν εἶναι πάγιον μηδὲ τὸ αὐτό*.

of Larissa[82] would have been bold enough to talk of the 'knowables' of *Soph.*, seeing that his attested views on κατάληψις make no distinction between classes of things, only between the senses in which they may be apprehensible.[83] We must thus assume that it was the Antiochians, still to be distinguished from the majority of the 'Platonics', who regarded non-knowables as the subject of *Tht.*

Thus discussions about the subject of *Tht.* mentioned by A in col. 2 are probably not the more advanced scholastic debates of the second century A.D., but livelier and more primitive quarrels belonging to the first half of the first century B.C., in which the protagonists were Philo, Antiochus, and Aenesidemus. The term 'Platonics' found at 2. 11 and fr. 4 is a device, perhaps a new device, for referring to all sects which claimed allegiance to Plato, or possibly to all scholars of Plato, but it is not yet the term for a particular school or for a particular dogmatic type of Platonist. The term 'Academic', however, plainly refers to a follower of the New Academic tradition (54. 40–55. 7, 70. 14), even though no scepticism, in our sense of the word, was required and doctrine was permitted.

If we place *K* in the age of Augustus or Tiberius rather than later, then we can give it a more meaningful role in the development of Platonism. Dillon (op. cit. p. 270) feels that the work 'in general maintains a level of stupefying banality'. Plutarch, though not a philosopher of the highest order, has a great deal more of interest to say on matters of interpretation. One would assume the same of Taurus, Albinus, Severus, and Numenius. But let us ask ourselves what was required in the generation or two following the extravagant distortions of Plato's epistemology which the age of Antiochus had produced.[84] The well-being of philosophy demanded that a straightforward account of the main Platonic texts should be given, avoiding wild attempts to force Plato into agreement with the views of the interpreter. *K* is such a work, steering a careful course between the sceptic and dogmatic views of Plato: 'I say, then, that in his ζητήσεις he inquires and does not declare himself, so that he sets nothing down as true or false; but to those familiar with his method he reveals his pleasure without our being aware of it' (59. 12–21). In A's view, Plato's opinions (and opinions he certainly had, for he also had δόγματα, 47. 48–48. 8, 54. 38–55. 13) emerged not through the words, but almost in spite of them. To this extent one is reminded of the attractive refrain of Eudorus of Alexandria: 'Plato is of many voices, not of many opinions'.[85]

Eudorus is the only serious candidate for consideration as the author of *K*, but we must defer consideration of his claims at present, since the authorship is of less importance than the place of A within the history of Platonism. We have seen, very broadly, his relationship to past discussion of *Tht.*, but not yet with what followed. Here it must be noted that his piety,[86] his deep interest in moral questions,[87] his dissatisfaction with Stoicism,[88] and his very mild New Academic sympathies all point

[82] Charmadas, however, was prepared to use the distinction between knowledge and right opinion (Cic. *De Or.* 1. 92).

[83] S.E. *PH.* 1. 235; see my interpretation, loc. cit. (n. 20, above) sections 5–6.

[84] Perhaps Antiochus' excesses were in the realm of physics (*Ac.* 1. 24–9), but see S.E. *Math.* 7. 141–4. The orthodox view of Plato at *Ac.* 1. 46 was fairly extreme, though not compared with the view refuted by anon. *Prol.* (see nn. 66, 75).

[85] Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 49. 25–50. 1 (with Heeren's supplement), also 55. 6; on Eudoran origin see H. Dörrie, *Platonica Minora* (München, 1971), pp. 159–60.

[86] See 7. 14–20 and 58. 39–59. 2.

[87] After his introduction A moves quickly on to discuss moral questions on the basis of semi-relevant material in *Tht.* (cols. 5–11).

[88] A looks critically at Stoic, and to a lesser extent Epicurean, material in cols. 5–11.

directly towards Plutarch: towards the figure who is the first undisputed Middle Platonist. It is not improbable that Plutarch actually followed *K* at the beginning of his first *Platonic Question*.[89] Where we do find a positive epistemology in Plutarch,[90] it is based firmly on the *Meno* as is *K*'s. Plutarch shares a strong, if not overriding, interest in the mathematical element in Plato's works with A and with others of his age (and also with Eudorus, see *Mor.* 1019e–1020c). Assuming that A made his name in Alexandria (an attractive conjecture, bearing in mind the interest shown in Aenesidemus and the fact that little attention is paid to Antiochus[91]), one would naturally look to Plutarch's tutor Ammonius[92] as a figure likely to have introduced him to A's work. Ammonius himself shared A's interest in flux-doctrine,[93] his faith in providence,[94] an emphasis on search rather than discovery,[95] and a lip-service to values of the Fourth Academy.[96] There are also elements of the *Meno*'s epistemology at *Mor.* 385c, where Ammonius is speaker.[97]

With Ammonius one naturally compares Philo of Alexandria, who shares with him the view that God alone truly 'is',[98] and who likewise combines with his strong religious conviction a wavering distrust of mortal knowledge.[99] Philo is usually seen as a dogmatist,[100] but one must ask in what sense (if any) this description might be valid. Dillon makes use of *Cong.* 140–4, where Philo employs Stoic definitions of τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη. He claims (p. 145) that the definition of knowledge as κατάληψις ἀσφαλὴς καὶ βέβαιος, ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου 'presupposes the whole Stoic theory of knowledge'. But it is well known that the New Academy adopted Stoic definitions without having any intention of adopting the system as a whole. Here Philo is merely

[89] See n. 56 above.

[90] Olymp. *In Phd.* 155. 24 ff. and 216. 1–26 (Norvin); see n. 55 above.

[91] Glucker *Ant.* pp. 90–7 challenges the notion that Antiochus could have influenced Alexandria directly though some influence may have come about through his pupils Dio and Aristo. I add that I find no evidence of A *ignoring* Antiochus, or failing to mention him where it was relevant to do so.

[92] See Glucker, *Ant.* pp. 124–34, on the relationship of Ammonius to Plutarch.

[93] *Mor.* 392a–393a, cf. J. Whittaker, 'Ammonius on the Delphic E', *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969), 185–92. For *K* see 63. 48 ff.

[94] *Mor.* 393ef, 413ef, 435e; cf. *K* 58. 39–59. 2.

[95] See *Mor.* 385cd. For him τὸ ζητεῖν is the source of philosophy (cf. *Meno* 86bc), while the source of search is τὸ θαυμάζειν and τὸ ἀπορεῖν (cf. *Meno* 84bc). Note too Ammonius' approval of the ζητήσεις that have sprung from the Delphic maxims (385d). *K* too sees ζητήσεις as the essence of Platonism, 58. 23, 59. 7, 13.

[96] *Mor.* 746b shows the semi-sceptic B35 of Xenophanes to be a favourite quotation of Ammonius; the Delphic maxims which he praises invite and receive (387 f., cf. 431a: τὸ ἄγαν τῆς πίστεως) an Academic interpretation. As for self-awareness, Ammonius relates it to awareness of our mortal nature, including our inability to apprehend and the non-apprehensibility of things of this world (392a–e), concluding ψεύδεται ἡ αἴσθησις ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον. Ammonius' caution is seen at *Mor.* 391ef (cf. 744b), and his willingness to judge by the criteria of τὸ εἰκός (435c) and πιθανότης (427f.; cf. Lamprias' reply at 428b) is significant.

[97] λόγον τινὰ ποθοῦντα διὰ τί καὶ διδασκαλίαν τῆς αἰτίας, cf. *Meno* 98a, *K* 3. 1–7.

[98] Philo's Biblical text is LXX Exod. 3: 14; the title ὁ ὤν occurs widely in his writings. For Ammonius see *Mor.* 393a ff.

[99] Philo's flux-doctrine and this-world scepticism occur most obviously at *Jos.* 125–47. Human life is compared with a dream (126), then Philo dwells on man's changes from birth to old age (127–9), recalling Ammonius' remarks at *Mor.* 392de; cf. A's comments on the growth-process, cols. 69–70, probably on 152e1. At 142 we read of τὸ ἐν τοῖς καταλήψεσιν ἀβέβαιον, and at 147 the flux/non-apprehension doctrine is applied specifically to earthly things, as opposed to heavenly things where both stability and cognition are to be found. Similar links between flux and non-apprehension are found in the Aenesideman passage at *Ebr.* 170, 172–4, 178–80.

[100] e.g. Dillon *MP*, p. 144 n. 1, where he assumes that Philo must, as a dogmatist, be using Aenesidemus for his own dogmatic purpose.

taking over from his source a body of theory which may be adapted for his own purposes without feeling that it conflicts with any of his basic convictions. The passage has signs of Antiochian influence,[101] and since the same definition of τέχνη as at *Cong.* 141 occurs also in Antiochus' pupil Aristo of Alexandria, who had become a Peripatetic,[102] it is possible that Philo draws on Aristo. This isolated passage thus provides no evidence for contemporary Platonism.

To support his reading of *Cong.* 140–4 Dillon also asserts that the Stoic theory of sense-perception is given at *Immut.* 41–4 and *QG* 3.3, but in neither passage is there much that is incompatible with a mild sceptical attitude. Thus virtually the whole case for a committed dogmatist epistemology in Philo's extensive work rests on one passage. If we were to take a different, much longer passage on which to base our assessment, *Ebr.* 166–205, we might conclude that Philo was a faithful, if rather incompetent follower of Pyrrhonism; but again only a few passages of harmless sceptical tendency could be used to support such a view.[103] A sensible estimation of Philo's work must rely chiefly on the recurrent factors, not on passages which are striking but unique. One such factor is the recognition of the αἰσθήσεις and the διάνοια or νοῦς as κριτήρια:[104] unremarkable in itself, but a criterion of the kind which A seems to recognize (δι' οὗ, col. 2); the criterion καθ' ὅ, i.e. the Stoic καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, is not part of Philo's regular epistemology,[105] a fact which points towards Fourth rather than Fifth Academic influence.[106]

The Aenesideman passage (*Ebr.* 166–205) contains several exhortations to suspend judgement,[107] and though Philo would not normally idealize ἐποχή, it features again in a more limited application at *Fug.* 135–6, 193, and 206. Here Philo is chiefly concerned that we should ἐπέχειν on matters which are ἄδηλα (206) or without πίστεις (136). It was the tendency to make pronouncements on unclear issues, which was the principal mark of dogmatism in the eyes of the sceptics,[108] but even the Stoic agreed on the need to suspend judgement on occasions,[109] so that Philo's warnings here are no indication of genuine scepticism – only of recognition that caution was often a virtue.

Antiochus' revived 'Platonic' dogmatism placed much emphasis on the reliability

[101] Note the infallibility (in his field) of one who is wise, temperate, or philosophical (142), which is inspired by the Stoic concept of the sage (cf. Cic. *Ac.* 2. 23–4, etc.). We have an Antiochian view of the relationship of mind to senses at 143: it uses them as servants, and through them perceives more than they do alone (cf. Cic. *Ac.* 2. 30; S.E. *Math.* 7. 144, 226; Ph. *L.A.* i. 29). At 144 we learn that just as mind is a sensation of the sensations (cf. Cic. *Ac.* 2. 30) so ἐπιστήμη is a τέχνη τεχνῶν (cf. Antiochus' 'ars quae vera a falsis possit distinguere', *Ac.* 2. 57).

[102] Aristo Alexandrinus, fr. 5 (Mariotti): 'ars...collectio est ex perceptionibus et exercitationibus ad aliquem vitae finem pertinens, etc.'. Mariotti compares Olymp. *In Gor.* 63. 11 = *SVF* i. 22. 3 ff. Aristo's defection is recorded by *Index Acad.* 35. 14; Strabo (17. 1. 5) calls him a Peripatetic.

[103] e.g. *Conf.* 125–7, *Fug.* 188–93, *Jos.* 125–47.

[104] e.g. *Ebr.* 169, *Conf.* 127, *Her.* 246.

[105] The adjective καταληπτικός occurs only at *Her.* 32 in the course of a totally unremarkable division of presentations. In the same passage and later at 209 he uses the pair ἀκατάληπτος and καταληπτός; the latter term occurs only 13 times in other treatises, often with a negative, never in such a way as to suggest strong Stoic influence.

[106] Philo of Larissa seems to have recognized criteria (Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 40. 19 Wachsmuth), probably intellect and senses; *K* 2. 23–32 may follow, as does Plut. *Mor.* 1024e. Antiochus insists on the retention of the Stoic criterion.

[107] *Ebr.* 169, 192, 200, 205.

[108] See S.E. *PH.* 1. 13; cf. how Plato and Protagoras are convicted of dogmatism at 1. 223 and 1. 219 respectively.

[109] Clem. *Strom.* 8. 16. 2 = *SVF* 2. 37. 10 ff.; *Ac.* 2. 53.

of our senses. Thus any attack on the knowability of the sensible world would constitute a threat to dogmatist epistemology in the Antiochian tradition.[110] Apart from the Aenesideman passage, part of the *De Josepho* (125–47) likens our apprehension of this world of flux to mere dreams. The tone of the passage may best be understood as stemming from a revived Heraclitism within 'Academic' circles.[111] One may trace other passages too with Heraclitan overtones (e.g. *Conf.* 104–6) or with criticism of sensation (e.g. *Fug.* 188–93). A further notable passage (*Spec.* 1. 333–43) condemns both those who attach excessive importance to the powers of the senses *and* those who overrate man's mind, as if to remind us rather that wisdom is God-given. *Prov.* fr. 1 conveys a similar message about the fallibility of even the most outstanding man.

Philo's language does not resolve the difficulties which one experiences in trying to place him on the scale of dogmatism and scepticism. Frequently enough he speaks of the κατάληψις of certain things as possible,[112] but that would not conflict with Fourth Academic principles as long as it was not the Stoic definition of κατάληψις which was employed (S.E. *PH.* 1. 235); on the other hand there are a number of cases of the language of mildly sceptical Platonism:

(*a*) τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀληθεστάτην αἰτίαν θεὸν ἀνάγκη μόνον εἰδέναι, τὴν δ' εἰκότι στοχασμῷ πιθανὴν καὶ εὔλογον εἶναι δοκοῦσαν οὐκ ἀποκρυπτέον. (*Opif.* 72)

(*b*) τὰ δὲ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν μεστὰ διαφωνίας γέγονε, τὸν πιθανὸν καὶ στοχαστικὸν νοῦν τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποδιδρασκούσης. (*Her.* 247)

(*c*) εἰκόσι στοχασμοῖς καὶ εὐλόγοις πιθανότησιν. (*Jos.* 143)

It is not so much that Philo tries to steer a middle course between scepticism and dogmatism: rather he sees mild scepticism as the proper product of philosophic enquiry, which will end in mere 'reasonable' and 'probable' conclusions. Men are bound to judge by such criteria (*Opif.* 45), unless, like Moses (*Sac.* 12–13), they are able to reject these New Academic criteria and replace them by a higher truth from God. These criteria are second best (*Spec.* 1. 38), the criterion of the 'Egyptian sophists' (*Migr.* 76, *Som.* 1. 220) whom Philo no doubt saw as the archetype of non-Jewish Alexandrian intellectuals. But traditional philosophy offers nothing more; *qua* philosopher, Philo retains a mild Academic scepticism, but no more.[113]

His mildness is evident at *Her.* 246, where he tries to take advantage of the disagreements among philosophers. Those who make man the measure are contrasted with those who confound the criteria of the mind and the senses; those who think that everything is non-apprehensible are then contrasted with those who think a very great deal to be apprehensible. One may associate the former sceptical group, whose activity is seen to be more destructive, with the Pyrrhonists (cf. *K* 63. 1–40), who would not

[110] Note Cic. *Ac.* 2. 19–20, 30, making much of the cognitive power of the senses.

[111] It is clear that flux-doctrine is most naturally at home in Platonism. The language of images and dreams suits Platonism (ἀναζωγράφειν, ἀνειδωλοποιεῖν, 126), as does the eternal wakefulness of the heavenly world (147). The phrase εἰκόσι στοχασμοῖς καὶ εὐλόγοις πιθανότησι (143) combines Platonic and Academic terminology. Pyrrhonism did not recognize the concept of πιθανότης, nor the distinction between ὄντα and μὴ ὄντα (126). At 142 we seem to meet the notion that κατάληψις can fall short of certainty, as in Philo of Larissa and [Galen] 14. 685 (Kühn). For a reply to H. von Arnim's theory that the Heraclitism of *Jos.* comes from Aenes. (*Quellenstudien zu Philon von Alexandria* (Berlin, 1888), 79 ff.) see Burkhard, op. cit. (above, n. 66), pp. 175–82.

[112] A striking case occurs early in *Somn.* 1, where Philo argues that the fourth items in various series of four components are ἀκατάληπτον while the rest are καταληπτά. But note that κατάληψις need not imply certainty in Philo, n. 111 above.

[113] Usually σκεπτικοί are just 'inquirers' in Philo (see K. Janacek in *Listy Filologicke* 102 (1979), 65–8), and for this meaning see *Her.* 247, 279, *Ebr.* 98, 202. The last-mentioned case of the non-sceptic sense is notable, as it comes at the end of the Aenesideman passage (preceded by σκέψεις ἀμύθητοι).

have *asserted* that things are non-apprehensible; the latter group, who do assert this, would appear to be the more radical adherents of the New Academy. Philo avoids associating himself with any of the groups mentioned, and attacks both 'Investigators' (i.e. sceptics: see R. Marcus in the Loeb) and 'Academics' at *QG* 3. 33.

Philo's anti-Pyrrhonist stance requires one to explain how it is that he is willing to follow eight of Aenesidemus' tropes at *Ebr.* 166–205. One assumes that he would have found Aenesidemus' writings dry and pointless, and I doubt whether it would have occurred to him to adapt such material for his own positive purposes. There are two main alternatives: (*a*) Philo's thought had gone through an early sceptic phase, and (*b*) he has inherited the ideas of *Ebr.* from a mild Academic source.[114] Let us consider the case for such a source.

There is no question that Philo must have had access to the work of his fellow-Alexandrian Aenesidemus, nor that he had the ability to adapt his ideas for his own purposes.[115] The question is whether he would have been more likely to be influenced by an Academic adaptation of the original. The character of the adaptation is consistent with mild Academic doctrine, leaning towards Plato. There is a constant and positive message behind the passage, to the effect that man's powers of cognition are weak (166 etc.) and that things are shrouded in obscurity (167 etc.). This would have sounded suspiciously like *dogma* to Aenesidemus,[116] and he would have taken objection to such language as πίστεις ἐναργεῖς ἀκαταληψίας (175) or τὸν . . . ἔλεγχον ἐναργῶς διασυνίστησιν (185). The sceptic had to oppose proof (πίστις),[117] and reject any classification of impressions such as is implied by the concept of ἐνάργεια (see *K* 61. 35). He does not affirm ἀκαταληψία, which is a New Academic principle.[118] Also New Academic is the term ἀπαράλλακτος, which occurs only in this essay (90, 169) of all extant Philonian works; at 90 it was applied to identical twins, a standard Academic example.[119] A Pyrrhonist could hardly speak of 'our joint criteria, sensation and intelligence, fashioned by nature . . . ' (169), nor even of a 'cause' (180).[120] Little in the way of Aenesideman language can be found,[121] and the third trope is missing.[122] The passage lacks the direct and methodical approach which other sources lead us to associate with Aenesidemus. A Heraclitism is present (170, 172–4, 178–80), but even

[114] Against this see Burkhard, op. cit. (n. 66), pp. 182–94.

[115] See Burkhard, op. cit. (n. 66), p. 193.

[116] I judge from Phot. Cod. 212, 170a2–3, 5–6, 9–11, where Aenes. seems to be criticizing the dogmatic terminology of Academic Heraclitism: 'at one time such, at another such, for one man such, for another such', etc. At 17–22 he complains openly about *dogma* in the Academy, attacking such distinctions as virtue/vice, good/bad, true/false, probable/improbable, real/not-real.

[117] Perhaps a sceptic's attack was directed against ἀπόδειξις and σημεῖα rather than πίστεις generally, but D.L. 9. 78, following mention of Aenes., says that sceptics abolish πίστις concerning πράγματα. Moreover Philo's πίστεις imply τὸ πιθανόν, which Aenes. rejects (Photius 170a7, 20), just as A's account of Pyrrho involves rejection of the ἐναργής/ἀμυδρός distinction (61. 35).

[118] Aenesidemus in Phot. cod. 212, 169b42: οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν τὸ παράπαν οὔτε ἀκατάληπτα πάντα εἴρηκεν . . ., and cf. *K* 61. 30–7: μηδεμίαν . . . διαφορὰν κατὰ τὸ . . . καταληπτὸν ἢ ἀκατάληπτον, which is intended to reject both terms.

[119] See Cic. *Ac.* 2. 56, 84.

[120] Aenes. in books 2 and 5 of his *Pyrrhonian Logoi* attacked both αἰτία and αἰτιολογία (Photius 170b3–8, 17–22).

[121] Perhaps ὁπωσοῦν at 166 and 198, found only 5 times in Philo but traced in Aenes. (D.L. 9. 78). Possibly κατατρίβω at 195, found only once elsewhere in Philo (*L.A.* 2. 98), but used similarly in Phot. Cod. 212, 169b24. Following K. Janacek (*Eirene* 14 (1976) 99), one is forced to consider also τὸ παράπαν (186), but this term is common in Philo.

[122] Since no attempt has been made to preserve the numbering of 'tropes' this is not surprising. Also missing is the ninth mode (tenth in D.L. 9. 87), but then there were only nine modes in

if theories of a Heraclitism in Aenesidemus are correct, the basic flux-doctrine which we find here is not that of Aenesideman Heraclitism as portrayed at S.E. *PH.* 1. 210–12: there opposite properties are attributed to objects as a result of conflicting impressions, here it is rapid change of properties which explains those conflicting impressions.[123] Heraclitism here resembles that which we find elsewhere in Philo, and that in turn resembles what we find in Ammonius and Plutarch, in Seneca's *Ep.* 58 (on Plato), and in Maximus Tyrius.[124] The common source (if any) could not be Pyrrhonist.

The total picture is Academic rather than Pyrrhonist in general tone and in detail, and has the added attraction of being in harmony with a great deal of what Plato said in *Tht.* about flux and the relativity of sensations (152a ff.). The picture of education as a mystery leading to a brief vision of reality at 168 seems highly Platonic. [125] So is the comparison of our waking world with our dreams at 180 (cf. *Tht.* 158b–d). *K* is witness to a brand of Platonism which saw deep connections between the revived Pyrrhonism of Aenesidemus *and* the Heraclitan flux-doctrine *and* Plato in *Tht.* A virtually accepts the Pyrrhonist claims of relativity in respect of the sensible world as well as the flux-doctrine. Undoubtedly he would have known the tropes of Aenesidemus, and he may well have used them (as Favorinus, another Academic, did later). The passage of Philo is far more literary and imaginative than anything which we meet in *K*, but then it presumably draws on a work of a literary genre rather than a basic commentary. On present knowledge it is possible that Philo follows some work of A, not only at *Ebr.* 166–205 but also at *Jos.* 125–47 and in other passages where Academic attitudes prevail.

A's kind of Platonism is also Philo's kind of Platonism. They share a readiness to discuss and make use of a number of Stoic ethical ideas as well as an interest in scepticism. Neither would be classed as sceptics today, for they both teach confidently and with positive purpose, and both seem to have a religious faith which surmounts doubts about the details of this world. They also share an interest in *Tht.*, from which Philo draws the longest of his Platonic quotations at *Fug.* 63 and 82.[126] Though these are taken from the moral digression (176ab/176c), Philo's interests extend to the 'midwifery' section (*Her.* 181, *Mut.* 144) and the wax-tablet episode (*Her.* 181, *Mut.* 212). One cannot assert that A influenced Philo; one can suggest that somebody like A did so.

Philo uses mild scepticism to lift our minds away from our thirst for earthly knowledge towards the non-material. Even in a passage which attaches importance to the sense (*Mig.* 187–97), we learn the need to escape their influence if we are to obtain higher knowledge. The message is indeed familiar from Plato's Middle Dialogues: *Phd.*, *Symp.*, *Rep.*, and *Phdr.* Allusions to these works, as to *Tim.*, *Tht.*, and *Laws*, are common in Philo.[127] The theme of the flight of the soul to a higher plane

Aenes.' *Hypotyposis* (Aristocles in Eus. *P.E.* 14. 760b), so that the tenth must have been a late development.

[123] See Burkhard op. cit. (above, n. 66), pp. 180–2 on the non-Aenesideman nature of the Heraclitism here.

[124] See J. Whittaker, 'Ammonius on the Delphic E' *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969), 185–92, on the connections.

[125] cf. Theon Smyrnaeus, *Expos.* 14. 17–16. 2 (Hiller); Albinus *Prol.* 6 (150. 15 ff. H). Perhaps also Cic. *Ac.* 2. 60, Plut. *Mor.* 391de (an odd reference to the mysteries in a Platonic context).

[126] See the note of F. H. Colson in the Loeb. The length of the quotation and the naming of the source of the earlier passage is remarkable in an author who usually only alludes to his Platonic sources.

[127] My own collection of Platonic allusions agrees with Dillon's findings (*MP*, p. 140), gathered from the Cohn–Wendland's index, as to the important dialogues for Philo. *Tim.* far outstrips others, and *Crat.* might also have been mentioned.

did not emerge in extant later writings until Philo (e.g. *Opif.* 70–1, *Her.* 68–70) and its origin has been the subject of contention.[128] But *Tht.* 176a 5–d 1 is the most striking passage in Plato concerning such a flight; it is this which Philo quotes at *Fug.* 63 and 82; it is this which identifies the flight with the process of assimilation to God – with which it is also connected by Philo (*Opif.* 69). Above all, it is this passage which, in a work on knowledge, clearly associates σοφία and ἄγνοια with that higher plane, pouring scorn on all other δεινότητες and σοφίαι (176c 4–d 1), making it the supreme authority for those who wished to combine mild scepticism of mortal matters with a belief in a higher wisdom, based on assimilation to God.

Details of Platonic interpretation before the time of Philo of Alexandria are few indeed, but we can say with some confidence that one could expect a commentary on *Tht.*, with emphasis on the moral digression, to have emerged during this period. A's interpretation of 176a 5–d 1 is lost together with all but the early part of *K*, but one can see from 7. 14–20 that the concept of assimilation to God was fundamental to A's ethics. Thus he must have discussed the passage at length, and, being about to write on *Phd.* (48. 7–11), he must have realized the importance to Plato of rising beyond what the senses offer, up to a purer world in which the intellect may triumph. When he promised that his account would show how Plato and the Academics (with very few exceptions) shared the most important *dogmata* (54. 43–55. 7) what could he have had in mind? I suggest (*a*) the doctrine of the flux and non-apprehensibility of the sensible world, (*b*) some basic points about the mind, memory and senses,[129] (*c*) the impossibility of building up any compound knowledge without knowable elements (cf. *Tht.* 201d ff.), and (*d*) the ideal of becoming as like a God as possible in wisdom and morality.[130]

These considerations suggest that *K* belongs shortly before Philo of Alexandria, just as previous evidence (pp. 167 ff.) placed him before Philo's contemporary Thrasyllus. Thus we are able to narrow our search to a period before A.D. 30, probably considerably before that date. Indeed another factor suggests that we ought to select a B.C. date for *K*. The Augustan age saw the introduction of a new criterion of knowledge, the *most accurate* impression of the eclectic Potamo (known to us from D.L. 1. 21 and the Suda). Col. 61 mentions various Hellenistic criteria and various distinctions between types of impression, asserting that Pyrrho would have rejected them all, regarding all impressions as of a uniform nature. This would have provided A with an excellent opportunity to mention the new criterion and the corresponding

[128] See R. M. Jones, 'Posidonius and the flight of the Mind', *CP* 21 (1926), 97–113.

[129] For an odd collection of Academic *placita* on the senses, of a basically Fourth Academic character, see Diels, *Dox.* 396b 5–7, 17–19, 398b 24, 403b 8–11.

[130] It is difficult to make out a case for ὁμοίωσις having been the New Academic *telos*, yet A seems to be committed to the defence of such a claim, since the *telos* is one of two supreme issues (*Ac.* 2. 29). Glucker has shown (*Ant.* pp. 55–60) that Cic. was aware of a *telos* espoused by Plato (*Ac.* 2. 129), for his position was said to be close to that of Erillus (the good = knowledge) and to have something in common with the Megarics (the good is one/same/eternal). Eudorus (Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 55. 15–17, on which see H. Dörrie, *Platonica Minora* p. 303) was aware that some saw wisdom + pleasure (allegedly the second good of *Phil.* 66b 1–3) as the *telos* of *human* life, suggesting that he was seen to propose some more *divine telos* even before Eudorus. Indeed both Posidonius (cf. F 187 Kidd) and Antiochus (in Clem. *Strom.* 2. 131. 2–133. 3, see R. Hoyer, *De Antiocho Ascalonita*, *Diss.* (Bonn, 1883), 26 ff.) seem aware that ὁμοίωσις θεῷ served as a kind of *telos* in Plato, though Antiochus recognized that the problem was extremely complex. *Ac.* 2. 129 demonstrates that Antiochus' Academic opponents also recognized the complexity of the issue, but saw that wisdom was crucial; Eudorus saw φρόνησις as the key to ὁμοίωσις (Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 49. 10), placing emphasis on *Tht.* 176c 4 and b 2 (μετὰ φρονήσεως). Note in particular that the wisdom of *Tht.* 176c 4 is not merely a system of factual knowledge, and thus not entirely incompatible with Academic hopes.

distinction between accurate and inaccurate impression, if (*a*) Potamo had already begun to use them and (*b*) A was aware that he had done so. So that, if A lived in close enough contact with Alexandria to hear of Potamo's work (as is highly probable), he was probably writing before Potamo tried to establish his criterion. Since this was some time in the Augustan age, a B.C. date for *K* seems likely.

If the author of *K* is a figure otherwise known to us as a Platonist, Academic, or scholar interested in Plato, and if he does not follow Thrasyllus and Philo of Alexandria, then there is little remaining doubt about his identity. Dio of Alexandria and Thrasyllus just qualify for consideration;[131] but if it is neither of them, then Eudorus of Alexandria alone remains. We may examine the claims of Dio and Thrasyllus first.

With Dio we encounter problems of deciding whether the Dio we meet in one context is identical with the Dio of another context. Dio was not an uncommon name, but it is perhaps not too ambitious to connect all references to a Dio from the Academy (where chronologically possible) with the man who appears as a respected pupil of Antiochus of Ascalon at Cic. *Ac.* 2. 12 and *Index Acad. Herc.* col. 35. Plutarch (*Mor.* 612e) records that a Dio from the Academy had thought the events of symposia worth recording, Stobaeus tells of an 'Academic' who made a memorable remark when returning from a symposium (*Flor.* 19. 17, p. 537 H), and Athenaeus has material from a Dio from the Academy which looks as if it may well derive from a symposium-style work (1. 34b). Strabo tells us that it was an 'Academic' Dio who died leading an embassy to Rome in 57 B.C. (17. 1. 11), and we may assume that the writer of symposia was the same Alexandrian who ended his life in this way. Thus, if he had written *K*, he would have done so at a date even earlier than I should have proposed for it.

The composition of symposia would certainly belong in the Platonic tradition, though it would offer equal attraction to the dogmatist and to the semi-sceptic. A positive message could easily be conveyed, but outright affirmation that P and $-Q$ could certainly be avoided. That Dio belonged to Antiochus' circle at the time of the *Sosus*-crisis, and that he was highly regarded by Antiochus, are not sufficient evidence to assume that Dio was such a committed dogmatist. Antiochus had written respected works as an Academic–sceptic (*Ac.* 2. 69), and we do not know whether his own group of followers was already formed before he took his last strides towards dogmatism. If it had been, then it is unlikely that all his followers would have embraced the Stoic criterion of knowledge without reservations. An adherent might well have stayed with Antiochus because of the attraction of his moral philosophy rather than because of confidence in Stoic epistemology. But even so, it is very difficult to believe that any Antiochian would have had the same sympathy for the Pyrrhonians that A shows in cols. 61 and 63, or that he could have subscribed to an epistemology which showed (apparently) no sign of Stoicism whatever.

We are better able to say what type of philosophy Thrasyllus adhered to. It was the Pythagorean wing of Platonism which attracted him,[132] together with mathematics, music, astronomy and astrology.[133] Though A took the mathematics of *Tht.* seriously, and regards Pythagoras as a forerunner of Platonic doctrine in at least one respect,[134] one would be wary of attributing to him such strong Pythagorean sympathies as to

[131] One might also mention Theomnestus, see below, p. 182.

[132] Thrasyllus wrote on the first Principles of Pythagoreanism and Plato (Porph. *Vit. Plot.* 20), and believed that Democritus had been a follower of Pythagoras (D.L. 9. 38).

[133] He is a major source of Theon's *Expositio* on Platonic mathematics; his astronomy features twice in Achilles *Intr. ad Aratum* (43. 9, 46. 30 Maass); musical work is mentioned by Porphyry (*Ptol. Harm.* 266); he became Tiberius' astrologer.

[134] Pythagoras is alleged to have introduced the problem of growth (70. 5–9).

Thrasyllus. Thrasyllus had also taken unusual interest in the arrangement of Plato's writings into tetralogies, in their classification, and in their subtitles,[135] while A seems not to have discussed the place of *Tht.* in a tetralogy or in a particular class of dialogue, for the scant remains of col. 1 suggest that the introductory words were about the historical background of *Tht.* A is thus unlikely to have arranged the books of Democritus either, as Thrasyllus did (D.L. 9. 45), nor does one expect him to have written *Prolegomena to the Books of Democritus* (cf. D.L. 9. 41). Moreover, if Thrasyllus had written *K*, then we should have expected a reference to Potamo's criterion (see above, p. 178). And finally, if A had subtitled *Tht.*, he would surely have called it *On simple Knowledge*, not just *On Knowledge* (see above, p. 167).

With Eudorus we at last meet a figure who is known to have commented upon a work of Plato, and to have had his comments read by Plutarch (*Mor.* 1013b, 1019e–20c), thus influencing second-century Platonism. It seems that he was influential enough in the age of Arius Didymus to warrant extensive use of his work, and hence a substantial passage from his work on the divisions of philosophy is used in Stobaeus (*Ecl.* 2. 42. 7 ff. Wachsmuth). For present purposes I shall follow the example of Zeller, Dörrie, Theiler, and Dillon in assuming that strong Eudoran influence continues not merely to 2. 45. 6 but well beyond, perhaps extending up to 2. 57. 12.[136] Since Stobaeus' immediate source, apparently Arius, was surely identical to that from which he derived the preceding division from Philo of Larissa (2. 39. 20 ff. Wachsmuth), and since both are praised and described as Academics, one suspects that there is some connection between Philo and Eudorus in the mind of Stobaeus' source. Eudorus has regularly been connected with the dogmatic 'Platonism' of Antiochus of Ascalon, not with Philo or his associates,[137] but there is no evidence to point towards such a connection. On

[135] Albinus *Prol.* 4 (149. 13 H), D.L. 3. 56–61.

[136] See E. Zeller, *Eclectics* (London, 1883), trans. Alleyne, pp. 104 n. 1, 105 n.1 = *Ph. Gr.* iii[5] pp. 634 n. 2, 635 n. 1; H. Dörrie, *Platonica Minora* (München, 1971), pp. 159–60, 303; W. Theiler, 'Philo von Alexandria und der Beginn des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus' in *Parusia: Festschrift für J. Hirschberger* (Frankfurt, 1965), pp. 214, 217, etc. = *Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur* (Berlin, 1970), pp. 498, 501, etc.; Dillon, *MP*, p. 116: 'After his summary of the whole subject-matter of ethics, Arius, it seems, goes on to give us a number of these *problêmata*'. Dillon appears to mean *Eudorus' problêmata*, which had made up his work on the divisions of philosophy (*Ecl.* 2. 42. 9), interpreting 2. 45. 7–10 to mean that Arius (?) presents some of these, but in revised order. He regards the material up to 55. 21 as Eudoran (p. 125), and 55. 22 ff. as Arius' summary. Though the arguments hitherto used for Eudoran influence after 2. 45. 7 are less than compelling, I am in broad agreement with the conclusion. *Ecl.* 2. 45. 11–57. 12 gives a Platonic–Academic view of ethics to balance the later Stoic (2. 57. 13 ff.) and Peripatetic (2. 116. 19 ff.) accounts, but the material is handled differently in so far as the emphasis falls on the *problêmata* themselves, not on a single set of doctrines; Plato's answers are given prominence, but interest is shown in related thinkers, as might be expected of an Academic. Interpretation of Plato is rather detailed to have originated with Arius, a Stoic, and Eudorus would be Arius' natural source for Academic material when he has just been consulting Eudorus' book of *problêmata*. Even if I am mistaken here, it must be noticed that the previous view of Eudorus has owed much to the same assumption.

[137] Glucker (*Ant.* p. 97, n. 268) rightly questions the usual view (e.g. Dörrie, *Hermes* 79 (1944), 26) = *Platonica Minora* p. 298) that Eudorus must have studied with Antiochus. Dillon (*MP*, p. 115) suggests indirect influence *via* Dio. Nothing in extant fragments had to be learnt from Antiochus' school; indeed Eudorus' basic study may have been with that of Posidonius, for (*a*) he is the source of Posidonian and Diodoran material in Achilles, (*b*) he may be the source of Posidonian interpretation of *Tim.* at Plut. *Mor.* 1023bc, (*c*) his view of the Platonic goal, deeply indebted to *Tim.* 90a–d (see n. 177), may derive from Posidonius' similarly inspired view that one must follow the *daemon* within one, as it is akin to that which governs the universe (Galen, *Plac.* 5. 469 = F 187 Kidd), and (*d*) Posidonian emphasis on controlling the *πάθη* may account for the prominence which Eudorus gives to the philosophy of impulse as one of the three parts

the contrary, Plutarch discusses the merits of certain interpretations of the *Timaeus* with him *employing deliberate New Academic terminology* (*Mor.* 1013b):

ὁ μὲν Εὔδωρος οὐδετέρους ἀμοιρεῖν οἴεται τοῦ εἰκότος· ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι τῆς Πλάτωνος ἀμφότεροι διαμαρτάνειν δόξης, εἰ κανόνι τῷ πιθανῷ χρηστέον οὐκ ἴδια δόγματα περαίνοντας ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ τι βουλομένους λέγειν ὁμολογούμενον.

Eudorus has acknowledged that there is some truth in the interpretations of both Xenocrates and Crantor concerning Plato's psychogony. No doubt he wishes to use elements of both interpretations in devising his own. In his tempered praise of these Academics he has suggested that both to some extent achieve τὸ εἰκός. Now Philo of Alexandria (*Opif.* 72, *Jos.* 143) provides evidence of the tendency during this period to associate τὸ εἰκός with the Carneadean criterion of τὸ πιθανόν. We cannot be sure that Eudorus was applying it in this way, for the status of Timaeus' monologue as an εἰκὼς μῦθος was well known; but Plato himself had identified τὸ πιθανόν with τὸ εἰκός at *Phdr.* 272e1, and explained the latter concept in terms of likeness to the truth (*Phdr.* 273d). Hence Cicero's *veri simile*, being closely linked with his *probabile* (*Ac.* 2. 32 etc.), is probably an attempt to render τὸ εἰκός, and he too must have seen that concept as being virtually identical with the New Academic criterion of judgement; his translation of *Tim.* 29cd confirms as much: 'contentique esse debebitis si probabilia dicentur', and 'si probabilia dicentur ne quid ultra requiratis'. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that in Eudorus' day any attempt to judge by τὸ εἰκός would be seen as use of the New Academic standard. Had Eudorus been an Antiochian Academic, then it is unlikely that he would have wished to be seen employing such a criterion.

The quarrel between Eudorus and Plutarch arose not over which criterion should be used, nor over its identification with New Academic probability, but over how it should be applied in this case. Plutarch claims that we should ask 'What is it likely that Plato was trying to say?', not 'What is likely to be the case?'.[138] We must apply our criterion to the interpretation of Plato, not to solving the problem in our own fashion. He implies that Eudorus had tried to show that the ideas of Xenocrates and Crantor were reasonable enough in their own right.

Next Plutarch tries to twist another aspect of Fourth Academic epistemology against Eudorus: the principle of ὁμολογία, associated with ἐνάργεια by Philo of Larissa (Numenius fr. 28 des Places = 8 Lang) and by Cicero's Academic 'Cotta' (*ND* 3. 9–11). This 'criterion' is employed by Plutarch himself at *Mor.* 1062e, where it is related to the dichotomy between 'common' and 'private notions'; his suspicion of 'private notions' may also be seen at *Mor.* 999f–1000c (cf. *K* 48. 34). The point made against Eudorus is that it is Plato's 'agreement' which we should be seeking when interpreting him; in such a case it is not 'private' as opposed to 'generally agreed doctrines' that one avoids, but private as opposed to non-Platonic.

The existence of a quarrel between Plutarch and Eudorus concerning the application of the principles of probability and of 'agreement' strongly suggests that they are

of ethics (*Ecl.* 2. 42. 13–24 and particularly 2. 44. 3–6). Just as Aristo and Cratippus could later describe themselves as 'Peripatetics', so a Posidonian who developed (*a*) doubts and (*b*) love of Plato might come to describe his philosophy as 'Academic' once the school itself had ceased to exist.

[138] As H. Cherniss (Loeb) points out, Plut. commits himself to proceeding on the basis of τὸ εἰκός at 1014a; τὸ εἰκός is again coupled with τὸ πιθανόν at 728 f.; and we have an example of Plut. insisting on the application of τὸ εἰκός to Plato's own opinion at 430b: πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου διάνοιαν ἐπάγειν τὸ εἰκός. I find no clear example of the application of these criteria in the remains of Eudorus.

Academics of similar persuasions engaging in an esoteric dispute. One might try to deny the existence of such a technical quarrel, but in that case one must offer another explanation of the apparently contrived technical language (εἰκός, κανών, πιθανόν, ἴδια δόγματα, ὁμολογούμενον).

While this is not conclusive evidence that Eudorus adhered to the semi-sceptical Platonism of Plutarch, it is an important piece of evidence in the absence of contrary indications. No less important is the fact that Eudorus is consistently referred to as an 'Academic' without any qualification.[139] We can be sure that the normal application of this term by the mid first century A.D. indicated only Academic sceptics,[140] as is the case in Philo of Alexandria (*QG* 3. 33). Then we may point to the case of Philostratus the Egyptian, who, in the age leading up to Augustus' triumph over Antony, i.e. the age of Arius and Eudorus, tried to claim the authority of the Academy for his sophistic practices: μὴ προσηκόντως, according to Plutarch (*Ant.* 80). Plutarch's words suggest that Philostratus' pursuits were not in keeping with the aims of the Academy rather than that he lacked the authority to use the title: indeed it is difficult to imagine how any such authority could be required after the breakdown of the philosophical schools. Why should a sophist claim to be an Academic? Presumably to give respectability to the practice of arguing on both sides of a question, a traditional ploy of the sophists too, particularly those who had special powers of rhetorical delivery. Theomnestus of Naucratis was another philosopher reported by Philostratus (*VS* 1. 6) to have been considered a sophist because of his rhetorical skill, but one cannot see why he should have seemed a sophist unless he had engaged in *rhetorical displays of his arguments*, aimed at impressing rather than at teaching. Arguments for both sides of the question would be a natural part of such a display, and it is reasonable to suppose that this Theomnestus should be identified with the Academic who taught Brutus in Athens in 44 B.C. (Plut. *Brutus* 24).[141] The fact that Brutus was willing to give ear to him certainly does not indicate that this Theomnestus was an Antiochian 'Old' Academic, and he may well have been only a temporary visitor to Athens.[142] It is more likely that he is part of a new Academic–sophist movement, which can account for Philo of Alexandria's association of sophistry with scepticism,[143] and which culminated in the activities of the 'Academic' Favorinus of Arelate.[144]

The fact that a sophist like Philostratus the Egyptian could call himself an Academic is a strong pointer towards that title's continued sceptic associations in the days of Cleopatra and Antony; Plutarch's questioning of his credentials is probably not original, but a signal that the correct application of the term had been a matter for debate among Philostratus' contemporaries. All the same we can say that Philostratus would not have found it attractive if its normal use at that time had been to indicate philosophers of Antiochian persuasion, who taught openly and with conviction.

[139] Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 42. 7 (Wachsmuth), Simpl. *In Categ.* p. 187. 10 (Kalbfleisch), anon. I *Intr. ad Aratum* (p. 97 Maass). The adjective is used, not the phrase 'from [the] Academy'.

[140] Philo *QG* 3. 33, Sen. *Ep.* 88. 44, Tac. *Dial.* 31; all point to the fact that Academics are expected to argue *in utramque partem*, and are most easily compared with Pyrrhonists.

[141] Glucker, *Ant.* p. 114 does not appear keen to accept this idea of K. G. Zumpt, *Über den Bestand der philosophischen Schulen in Athen und die Succession der Scholarchen* (Berlin, 1844), p. 69, followed by Zeller *Ph. Gr.* iii.[5] p. 630 n. 4.

[142] Glucker, *Ant.* p. 115, observes that Cicero does not send his son to hear Theomnestus in 45 B.C., even though that Academic was available there in 44 B.C.

[143] *QG* 3. 33, *Cong.* 52, *Fug.* 209; note also the use of Academic terminology when Philo speaks of the 'Egyptian sophists', *Migr.* 76, *Somn.* 1. 220.

[144] An Academic rather than a Pyrrhonist; see Glucker, *Ant.* p. 281.

Plutarch and other later authors seem to avoid describing Antiochus or his brother Aristus as 'Academics' without qualification,[145] indeed only Dio is regularly known as an 'Academic' of those known to have studied under Antiochus. Whether or not Dio remained committed to Antiochianism, he did not, in spite of his prominence at Alexandria, cause Academicism to be identified with Antiochianism there. Even if he would have liked that to happen, the nature of 'Academic' philosophy had probably been determined rather by Aenesidemus' picture of it as a weak form of scepticism which failed to apply its principles fully, for Aenesidemus too taught at Alexandria.[146] And since there is a fair chance that it was Alexandrian scholarship that produced the 'Aetius' doxography, one must note that the Academics who appear four times in the b-column seem to belong to the mild Fourth Academic mould.[147]

Thus an 'Academic' in Alexandria during the second half of the first century B.C. must be expected to have some slight leaning towards mild scepticism, and this agrees with the remaining evidence for Eudorus. Even though he seems to have been influential in the formation of Middle Platonist doctrine, there is no evidence that he was dogmatically committed to any of it. He reports the beliefs of Pythagoras and Plato as he understands them,[148] he records the cosmological views of Posidonius and Diodorus,[149] he approves Old Academic (and probably Posidonian) interpretation of the Timaeus,[150] and he attacks the organization of Aristotle's *Categories*.[151] We see what he approves of and what he does not, but the same can be said of Cicero and Plutarch, who remained loyal to the New Academy. He uses definitions (Stoic ones),[152] and produces his own division of philosophy;[153] but these are respectable practices for an Academic, designed to clarify our notions (διαρθροῦν τὰς ἐννοίας in the language of *K* and probably of Eudorus),[154] and to provide a basis for rational discussion.

[145] Plut. *Luc.* 28. 7: 'Antiochus the philosopher', 42. 2–3: 'not the allegedly "new" Academy'; no title is afforded to Antiochus or Aristus at *Brut.* 2. 1–2, *Cic.* 4. 1. Strabo talks similarly of 'Antiochus the philosopher' (16. 2. 29), while Carneades is still the archetypal Academic (17. 3. 22). [146] Eus. *Praep. Evang.* 14. 763d (from Aristocles).

[147] See above, n. 129. Note that in contrast to Plato and other early thinkers, who are together credited with the view that the senses are 'false' in the preceding lines, the Academics are said to accept that they can be *healthy*, but not that they have sufficient *accuracy*. The 'Academic' position is thus depicted as being more reasonable than Plato's (though well short of Antiochus').

[148] Plato in Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 49. 8 ff., 2. 53. 1 ff., 2. 54. 10 ff. (Wachsmuth); also Plut. *Mor.* 1013b, 1019e, 1020c; possibly some doxographical entries in Achilles, *Intr. ad Aratum*. Pythagoras in Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 49. 8–9, 16–21; Simpl. *In Phys.* p. 181. 10 ff. (Diels).

[149] Achilles, *Intr. ad Aratum* 30. 20 (Maass); probably other views of Posidonius and Diodorus reported in this work.

[150] Plut. *Mor.* 1013b: no doubt he is approving of (*a*) Xenocrates' use of the principles of number, and (*b*) Crantor's having constructed the soul out of the materials which it is meant to cognize. Posidonius' interpretation at 1023bc appears to preserve the element of number, probably by using the Same and the Different as vehicles for the One and the Dyad (as in Plut. at 1024d, probably from Eudorus); it certainly postulated that the soul was composed of an intelligible stuff and a sensible stuff, in conformity with the requirement that it should apprehend intelligibles and sensibles, and we know from S.E. *Math.* 7. 93 that Posidonius adhered to the like-by-like theory of cognition when interpreting *Tim.*

[151] Simpl. *In Categ.* 159. 32, 174. 14, 187. 10, 206. 10, 236. 28, 246. 22, 256. 16, 263. 27, 268. 13 (Kalbfleisch). [152] Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 46. 5–10; Achilles *Intr. ad Aratum* 30. 20 (Maass).

[153] The material in Stob. comes from his διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου (*Ecl.* 2. 42. 8 Wachsmuth).

[154] For the concept of διάρθρωσις ἐννοιῶν in *K* see 46. 44, 47. 45, 53. 46, 56. 36. For διάρθρωσις in Eudorus see Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 49. 9, 2. 51. 8 (Wachsmuth); in neither case does the term appear with ἔννοια, though in the former case the object of the διάρθρωσις certainly was an ἔννοια of the τέλος.

The tendency to regard Eudorus as part of an eclectic 'Platonist' movement that began with Antiochus is mistaken. The latter is influenced by Plato (+Old Academy), Aristotle (+Theophrastus), and the Stoa; he does not acknowledge the differences between these schools to be great, but sees himself as the follower of a single philosophical tradition.[155] He cannot, therefore, have seen himself as an eclectic. It is agreement between schools which allows him to dogmatize, just as disagreement entitles Philo of Larissa to doubt.[156] Eudorus sees Plato as having a coherent body of doctrine, sometimes presented in a Pythagorean manner, sometimes not.[157] He sees a greater affinity between Plato and Pythagoras than we should today,[158] but this makes it less likely that he would have seen Aristotle and the Stoa as a continuation of the Platonic tradition. Aristotle seems to be an enemy (see n. 151). The cosmology, and probably the ethics, of Posidonius and Diodorus are respected, but not in such a way as to equate Platonism with Stoicism.[159] Thus Eudorus, unlike Antiochus, might well have admitted taking material from disparate philosophical sources. Indeed, such a policy ought to come from one who takes what is probable where he finds it, as Cicero thought the Carneadean school did (*Ac.* 2. 7–9). It should not come from one who trusts in a single body of doctrine which can be apprehended with certainty, for such doctrine must be found in a single teacher (the sage), making a plurality of sources unnecessary.

Eudorus unquestionably had doctrine, and some of his interpretations of Plato and Pythagoras show sufficient bias for one to regard the doctrines attributed to them as his own beliefs – in particular the doctrine of a single metaphysical first-principle, over and above two opposite principles. This may take the (Platonic) form of a One over and above Ideas and Matter,[160] or the (Pythagorean) form of a higher One over a One and Dyad (these latter being the formal and material principles).[161] Nor is there doubt that some of Eudorus' own beliefs emerge in his division of moral philosophy.[162] But there is no doubt that A held many doctrines, as did Philo of Alexandria and Plutarch, upon whom we suspect A's influence: doctrine rather than dogma (in our sense). Philo and Plutarch have a very fluid doctrine, built in various ways around a few key principles. In Eudorus' terms, they (like Plato) are πολύφωνος without being πολύδοξος (Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 49. 25, 2. 55. 6). Since Eudorus admired this quality in Plato, we must assume that he tried to imitate it himself, revealing his beliefs somewhat

[155] e.g. Cic. *Ac.* 1. 18, 43, 2. 15.

[156] If Cic. follows Philo at *Ac.* 2. 116–34.

[157] Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 49. 18–23: this shows various ways, including the Pythagorean one, in which Plato has presented his doctrine of the *telos*. At 2. 50. 2–4 (Wachsmuth) the unity of the doctrine is stressed.

[158] This may be typical of his age, for so do Posidonius (T95 Kidd on the tripartite soul; perhaps he too saw much of *Tim.* as Pythagorean, for see S.E. *Math.* 7. 93–4) and, one suspects, Thrasyllus. See also *K* 70. 5–9 and Achilles, *Intr. ad Aratum* 37. 29–38. 2 (Maass), both of which may be the work of Eudorus. Moderatus and Numenius continue the trend. Known examples in Eudorus are Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 49. 8, 18–21 (Wachsmuth) and Simpl. *In Phys.* 181. 10 ff. (Diels). The trend stems from a search for increasingly ancient authorities.

[159] For cosmology see n. 149; to expect to find distinctive Posidonian ethics in Eudorus would be highly optimistic, though he certainly follows Posidonius in regarding the distinction between rational and non-rational parts of the soul as fundamental.

[160] Seen in his 'Correction' to the text of Arist. *Meta.* 988 a 7, recorded by Alex. Aphr. *In Meta.* 59. 1 ff.

[161] Simpl. *In Phys.* 181. 10 ff. (Diels).

[162] He usually gives the impression of being firmly in agreement with those doctrines which he attributes to Plato, and he speaks on his own authority when criticizing the younger Peripatetics (*Ecl.* 2. 46. 13–17 Wachsmuth).

indirectly. In such circumstances it is unprofitable to attempt direct comparison between Eudorus' *doctrines* and those of others, since he gave no *statement of doctrine*. We must rather compare interests.

Eudorus appears nine times in Simplicius' *Commentary on the Categories*.[163] He is numbered, along with his rival Aristo, Boethus, and Andronicus, among the παλαιοὶ ἐξηγηταί. The title ἐξηγητής may not describe him accurately, as the fragments suggest that he approached the *Categories* as an Academic critic rather than as a devoted commentator. One also wonders whether he tackled the whole work, as surviving criticism concerns material from 6a36 ff. to 10a11 ff. only, and his interests are clearly centred on the concepts πρός τι, ποιόν, and ποσόν. In *K* the first of these appears at 20. 30–7, 40. 8–11, 63. 1–40, 68. 1–7, and 68. 19–36. In the first two cases, where τὸ πρός τι is contrasted with τὸ τί ἐστιν and τὸ καθ' αὑτό respectively, nothing in the text of *Tht.* calls for the introduction of these distinctions, and so their appearance must be credited to the author's interest. From the later passages it appears that A accepts the view that all things are πρός τι as far as the physical world is concerned. Hence, if A is Eudorus, then we can explain the thrust of the first extant Eudoran criticism at *In Categ.* 174. 14 (Kalbfleisch): Aristotle, he claims, distinguished between καθ' αὑτό and πρός τι but fails to consider the former. As Eudorus had been mentioned as one commentator who failed to understand Aristotle's use of the term πρός τι (159. 31–3 K), one might naturally assume that he had understood Aristotle according to his own later interpretation of πρός τι, by which all aspects of the physical world would be regarded as relative. Aristotle is accused of failing to discuss anything which he, Eudorus, could consider καθ' αὑτό, a Platonist's jibe at Aristotle's rejection of Platonic Ideas.[164] If such a criticism seems futile when considered *as a direct criticism of Aristotle*, one must remember that Eudorus' immediate target was probably Aristo of Alexandria, who also seems to have used the term in a very broad sense when interpreting the *Categories*.[165]

One Eudoran criticism is directed against the order in which substance, quantity, and quality are tackled, and it is argued that the logical order would be substance–quality–quantity.[166] This agrees with Ps.-Archytas.[167] After these three Eudorus appears to have placed time/place, though we cannot assume that he took great interest in questions of order *for their own sake*; the criticism of the order quantity–quality is a criticism of Aristotle's methodology, like other Eudoran criticisms.[168] If Eudorus was convinced of an *inviolable* order, then he is not A, for A mentions substance, quantity and quality in their Aristotelian order at 68. 1–15: otherwise this column seems to support Eudoran authorship. It comments upon *Tht.* 152d2–4: ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὁποιονοῦν τι... The τι is held to show substance, the ἕν quantity, and the ὁποιονοῦν τι quality. The αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό is interpreted as meaning that substance, quantity, and quality are all πρός τι, never καθ' αὑτό, in this world of flux. While A mentions quantity before quality, it should be said (*a*) that Plato consistently does the same throughout 152d, and (*b*) that

[163] See above, n. 151.

[164] A similar tendency is found in Nicostratus, Simpl. *In Categ.* 73. 15 ff. (Kalbfleisch).

[165] He is quite capable of arguing that the universe is πρός τι at Simpl. *In Categ.* 188. 31 ff. (Kalbfleisch).

[166] ibid. 206. 10 ff.

[167] ibid. I cannot here discuss the relationship of Ps.-Archytas to Eudorus, but tend to believe that 'Archytas' follows later.

[168] Perhaps their general futility is a reaction against the solemnity with which *Categ.* was treated by Peripatetics.

there is no pretence of a methodical approach. A shares with Eudorus an interest in the group of three principal categories, an interest in reducing their status to the level of 'relative', and (perhaps) an interest in denying to Aristotle the credit for their introduction. A's comments here are much as one would expect from a Platonist with Eudorus' interest in the *Categories*.

Other interests shared by A and Eudorus are easily found: εὐφυΐαι,[169] οἰκείωσις,[170] ἔρως,[171] all of which are given rather more attention by both authors than one might have expected. A also shows the tendency, well known in Eudorus but present in Posidonius also,[172] to trace Platonic doctrine back to Pythagoras.[173] Such inconclusive points of contact do assist one to create a picture of similarity of interests. Likewise, though it is not remarkable that both see ὁμοίωσις θεῷ as the Platonic τέλος,[174] it appears that both write early enough to want to *demonstrate* the concept's importance in Plato.[175] Neither shows the later inclination to relate the concept to a secondary God.[176] Eudorus, while detecting the doctrine at *Rep.* 613ab and seeing *Tim.* 90a–d as a passage of enormous importance,[177] still regards *Tht.* 176a–c as crucial.[178] This passage gives the allegedly Pythagorean concept additional διάρθρωσις,[179] which is what φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι need in *K* (46. 44); later, in Plutarch and Albinus, emphasis is placed rather upon the need to *awaken* them.[180]

Although we have clear indications of the importance of λογισμός in Eudorus,[181] we know nothing of his epistemology proper. Likewise we know nothing of A's physics. Comparison is only possible on their approach to ethics and to the categories. Even in ethics too little is known to present much overlapping or conflicting material. Both seem to see a gulf between perfected virtue seen as a near-unity[182] and the non-rational contributions to a better life.[183] Both claim that the ancients recognized ethical concepts that only later became prominent.[184] It would not require great powers of imagination to reconcile all that is known of Eudorus with all that is known of A.

[169] Eudorus in *Ecl.* 2. 48. 1, 2. 43. 19; *K* 4. 31–5. 3, 9. 30–11. 40.

[170] Eudorus in *Ecl.* 2. 47. 12 ff., etc.; *K* 5. 14–8. 6.

[171] Eudorus in *Ecl.* 2. 43. 19–44. 1; *K* 8. 23–7. Note that Dio of Alexandria (Plut. *Mor.* 612e) also shares the interest of both these passages in symposia.

[172] For Eudorus see n. 158; for Posidonius see T 91, T 95 (Kidd).

[173] See *K* 70. 5–9.

[174] *K* 7. 14 and Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 49. 8 ff.

[175] *K* has δείξομεν (preceded by a brief lacuna), cf. *Ecl.* 2. 50. 6 ff.

[176] As *Didasc.* 28 (181. 36H); hence at 2 (153. 4–7H) we meet ὁμοίωσις πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, a better description of the process described at *Tim.* 90a–d, cf. Albinus *Prol.* 5 (150. 8–12H). Note that Eudorus' comments on Pythagoras' directive 'follow God' do make it clear what kind of God he envisages man following: the intelligible principle of cosmic harmony (Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 49. 16–18 Wachsmuth), not an anthropomorphic one. Hence he has the same God in mind as Albinus and [Alcinous], but as yet there is no need to distinguish this God from a higher one. Presumably the mistake against which [Alcinous] reacts had not yet been made.

[177] See Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 47. 6, 49. 19–21, 50. 7, 53. 1–4; *Tim.* also determines what kind of God we must follow, 49. 16–18.

[178] Of Eudorus' source-passages this alone has the phrase which he sees as Plato's clarification of the concept: κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 49. 10 Wachsmuth).

[179] See above, nn. 154, 178.

[180] *Mor.* 1000e; *Prol.* 6 (150. 21 H); cf. *Didasc.* 5 (158. 3 H).

[181] Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 53. 7–17 (Wachsmuth), cf. 2. 42. 20.

[182] *K* 9. 37–10. 3; Eudorus *can* talk of the virtues separately, *Ecl.* 2. 43. 12, but elsewhere tends to think of it as a single entity (e.g. *Ecl.* 2. 50. 4–6, 51. 1–2 Wachsmuth).

[183] K 9. 37–10. 3 allows the εὐφυΐαι to oppose one another, unlike the perfected virtues. Eudorus introduces his conception of the ὑποτελίς, which compensates for the remoteness of his τέλος (Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 47. 12 ff. Wachsmuth).

[184] Eudorus on the ὑποτελίς (Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 48. 3–5 Wachsmuth), and *K* 7. 20–5 on οἰκείωσις in Socrates and the Sophists. Note that Eudorus associates οἰκείωσις with the ὑποτελίς at 2. 47. 12–18, so that their claims are almost identical.

Eudorus thus remains the principal contender for the credit of having written *K*. If positive evidence is thin, it must be noted that differences between A and most Middle Platonists were easily detected. Absence of conflicting approaches, attitudes, and doctrines is thus an important indication that Eudorus of Alexandria wrote *K*. He is the sole Academic–Platonist commentator known to have flourished during the probable period of *K*'s composition.[185]

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